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AID FOR TRADE:

A ROADMAP FOR SUCCESS

PHOENIX

X.F. CAI*

I. INTRODUCTION

Let us imagine a cooperative of mango growers in Mali,' one of the poorest
countries in Western Africa. These mango farmers grow delicious mangos prized
by local consumers for their sweetness, firmness, and long shelf life. Let us further
imagine that our mango farmers dream of expanding their business beyond local
demands to export their mangos to markets in Europe, where they can garner
higher prices for their produce. How would they make their dream come true?
Imagine the difficulties our mango growers would have to overcome. Perhaps the
roads from Mali to the closest seaport of Dakar, Senegal are poorly maintained and
unreliable. Perhaps no fleet of refrigerated trucks is available to transport the
mangoes to port. Perhaps the Mali government does not have a system in place for
inspecting agricultural products for export to meet the safety and health regulations
of the European Union. Aside from these infrastructural concerns, the farmers
may not possess the know-how to market their products to compete effectively

*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Denver Sturm College of Law, University of California at
Berkeley College of Law: Boalt Hall, J.D. 1999; Washington University in St. Louis, B.A. 1996. I
would also like to thank the editors of the Denver Journal of International Law and Policy and Peter
Smith, the Sutton Colloquium Issue editor for their invaluable assistance. Any errors in the article are
solely my responsibility.
1. Mali is, of course, one of the major producers of cotton in Africa. As a member of the Cotton
Four, Mali has been pushing, thus far in vain, for the United States, European Union, and other
developed countries to open their markets to imported cotton from Africa. For an excellent description
of the intractable position of the Cotton Four, see generally, Kevin C. Kennedy, The Incoherence of
Agricultural, Trade, and Development Policy for Sub-SaharanAfrica: Sowing the Seeds of False Hope
for Sub-Saharan Africa's Cotton Farmers?, 14 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POLY 307, 315 (2005) (arguing that
"[c]otton subsidies, especially those bestowed by the United States upon its cotton farmers, have had at
the least a price suppressing effect on world prices for cotton, to the detriment of cotton farmers in subSaharan Africa"); see also Oxfam, "White Gold" Turns to Dust: Which Way Forwardfor Cotton in
West
Africa?,
Oxfam
Briefing
Paper,
Mar.
2004,
4-6,
available
at
http://www.oxfam.org.uk/resources/policy/trade/downloads/bp58_cottonwafrica.pdf;
Charles
E.
Hanrahan, CRS Report for Congress, The African Cotton Initiative and WTO Agricultural Negotiations
1-2 (2004), available at http:// www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets /crs/RS21712.pdf; Ruth Gordon,
Essay: Sub-Saharan Africa and the Brave New World of the WTO Multilateral Trade Regime, 8
BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL'Y 79, 121 (2006) (arguing that sub-Saharan African countries may
have no choice but to disengage from the international trade regime and explore regional solutions).
Largely because Mali's dominant agricultural product, cotton, is so controversial and on which
negotiated market access issues overshadow aid for trade possibilities, I choose to focus the
hypothetical on a less fraught and complicated agricultural product.
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with mangos grown in Mexico, California, or the Philippines. To whom should
our hypothetical farmers turn for assistance? The answer, surprisingly, may be the
WTO.
Traditionally, when one thinks of development and aid, the World Trade
Organization (WTO) does not immediately come to mind. Rather, the usual
suspects are the development agencies of the UN,2 private non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), and the much beleaguered World Bank 3 and International
4
Monetary Fund (IMF).
Nonetheless, development had been a hot topic at the
WTO recently. In particular, aid for trade has emerged as the rising star, invested
with the hopes of many as the best means to carry out the laudable goals of the so
called "development ' 5 or Doha Round 6 of multilateral negotiations. While the
2. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is the UN's global development
network, an organization advocating for change and connecting countries to knowledge, experience and
resources to help people build a better life. The UNDP is on the ground in 166 countries, working with
them on their own solutions to global and national development challenges. Under the sponsorship of
UNDP, world leaders have pledged to achieve the Millennium Development Goals, including the
overarching goal of cutting poverty in half by 2015. For more information on the Millennium
Development Goals, see infra text pp. 119-20.
3. Steven R. Weisman, Wolfowitz Resigns, Ending Long Fightat World Bank N.Y. TIMES, May
18, 2007, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/18/washington/I8wolfowitz.html.
4. Steven R. Weisman, LM.F. Faces a Question ofldentity, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 28, 2007, at Cl,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/28/business/worldbusiness/28imf.html
(quoting a
statement by the newly appointed managing director that the IMF faces questions of both "relevance
and legitimacy.").
5. The member nations of the WTO launched the Doha Development Agenda ("DDA") on
November 14, 2001. The initiative seeks to change the orientation of the global trade architecture to
make it more supportive of development. See World Trade Org., The WTO Hosts Public Symposium:
The
Doha
Development
Agenda
and
Beyond,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dda-e/symp-devagenda-02-e.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2008)
(quoting statements by then WTO Director General Mike Moore, who spoke about the Doha
Declaration's emphasis on the major role of international trade in the promotion of economic
development and the alleviation of poverty).
6. The Doha Round of trade negotiations were launched in 2001, soon after the attacks of
September 11, 2001. The self-styled "development round" was to be an ambitious effort to extend the
reach of globalization to help the world's poor gain access to global markets for agricultural products,
among other goals. In order for the Doha Round to succeed, more developed economies had to agree
to lower tariffs for foreign farm products and slash barriers and subsidies in farming domestically. The
Doha Round was suspended officially on July 24, 2006, when it became obvious that gaps were still too
wide among the six principal negotiating countries (Australia, Brazil, the European Union (E.U.), India,
Japan and the United States (U.S.)). As the talks continued to stall, Mr. Lamy observed, on October 10,
2006, that "it is now obvious that the cost of failure, and the missed opportunity to rebalance the trading
system, would hurt developing countries more than others." World Trade Org., Lamy: Round Failure
Would
Hurt
Developing
Countries
More
Than
Others,
Oct.
10,
2006,
http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/news06_e/tncchairjreport_10oct06 e.htm; see also, In the
Twilight of Doha, THE ECONOMIST, July 27, 2006, at 63. Little progress was made in 2007, but Pascal
Lamy, the Director General of the WTO, believes that the round may be concluded in 2008 following
the issuance of new draft framework deals from the chairs of the WTO negotiating committees on
agriculture and industrial goods trade. These reports should contain proposals, called modalities, for
expanding market access for agricultural and industrial products by developing nations. On December
5, 2007 Pascal Lamy told reporters that "[I]f we agree on modalities early next year, I believe we could
be able to conclude the round before 2008." WTO Negotiators Look to 2008, Though DOHA Deal
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Doha Round has collapsed, seemingly moribund for moment, WTO officials have
been casting about for another means of spurring economic growth in the
developing countries. 7 The answer of the moment is aid for trade, the appealing
simple idea of building trade capacity from the ground up with various forms of
trade-targeted aid. Aid for trade is broad, multifaceted, and complex, comprising
forms such as technical assistance (helping countries develop trade policies,
negotiate more effectively, and implement outcomes), technology transfers,
infrastructural projects, capacity-building, and adjustment assistance (helping with
the costs associated with tariff reductions and declining terms of trade). Aid for
Prospects Look Slim, BRIDGES WEEKLY TRADE NEWS DIGEST, Dec. 5, 2007,
http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/07-12-05/storyl.htm. The WTO did issue a new framework containing
modalities or formulas for reducing agricultural subsidies on February 8, 2008. See World Trade Org.,
Draft Blueprints Issued for Final Deal on Agricultural and non-Agricultural Trade, (Feb. 8, 2008)
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/agric.e/chair._texts08_e.htm (last visited May8, 2008). The initial
response to the draft framework has not been very promising, however. See Press Release, Institute for
Agriculture and Trade Policy, New WTO Agriculture Text Falls Short-Again (Feb. 8, 2008),
http://www.iatp.org/iatp/press.cfm?refid=101542. (last visited May 8, 2008). See also David Blandford
et al., Implications of the WTO February 2008 Draft Agricultural Modalities for the United States,
available at www.ifpri.org/events/seminars/2008/20080501/20080501USLabordeetal.pdf (last visited
May 8, 2008).
7. See World Trade Organization, The Sub-Committee on Least-Developed Countries,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/devel e/dev sub committee ldc e.htm. (last visited Feb. 18,
2008) (explaining that the WTO recognizes as LDCs those countries which have been designated as
such by the United Nations. There are at present 50 LDCs on the UN list, thirty-three (with the
accession of Cape Verde as a member in December 18, 2007) of which are Members of the WTO); see
also United Nations Statistics Division: Definition of Developed, Developing countries,
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cdb/cdb dict_xrxx.asp?def code=491 (last visited Feb. 18, 2008) (stating that
"[t]here is no established convention for the designation of "developed" and "developing" countries or
areas in the United Nations system. In common practice, Japan in Asia, Canada and the United States
in northern America, Australia and New Zealand in Oceania and Europe are considered "developed"
regions or areas. In international trade statistics, the Southern African Customs Union is also treated as
developed region and Israel as a developed country; countries emerging from the former Yugoslavia are
treated as developing countries; and countries of eastern Europe and the former USSR countries in
Europe are not included under either developed or developing regions."). But see United Nations
(LDCs),
Developed
Countries
of
Least
Division:
Definition
Statistics
(last visited January 18, 2008)
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cdb/cdbdict-xrxx.asp?defcode=481
(explaining that the UN, however, does have a system to designate a list of those countries considered
to be Least Developed Nations (LDCs), whereby on the recommendation of the Committee for
Development Policy, the General Assembly decides on the countries to be included in the list of the
least developed countries. In Africa, they are: Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cape Verde,
Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, D. R. of the Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea,
Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania,
Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Togo,
Uganda, U.R. of Tanzania, Zambia. In Asia and the Pacific, they are: Afghanistan, Bangladesh,
Bhutan, Cambodia, Kiribati, Lao P.D.R., Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu,
Vanuatu, Yemen; In Latin America and the Caribbean: Haiti). While there are numerous significant
differences among countries falling into these groups, in this article, I refer generally to "developing
nations" to include all the LDCs and all the developing economies, without necessary differentiating
between them. This is not to say the differences between them are not important -they certainly are.
Instead, it reflects on the fact that they share certain common concerns, particularly with respect to
trade, such that they may be treated as one group for the purpose of this article. Thus, the term
"developing nations" is used merely as a convenient short-hand.
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trade is such a hot topic these days that Pascal Lamy, Director General of the
WTO, recently devoted a whole conference (a Global Forum on Aid for Trade) to
it, and afterwards went on tour to promote its virtues to WTO member nations and
NGOs. 8
This article seeks to critically examine aid for trade, to assess its shortcomings
and strengths, and to offer a roadmap for implementing it with success. Part II
begins by taking a very selective and brief look at the development of trade-related
aid from the end of World War II into the 21st century, with a focus on the
historical and political tensions that have lingered and continue to shape aid for
trade today. Part III provides both a description and a frank assessment of how aid
for trade is currently conducted, and argues that it is still largely ineffectual in
promoting sustainable economic development where it is most needed. Part IV
examines the inherent conflicts between the aid regime and the trade regime,
which conflicts yield implications for how aid for trade should be structured.
Another goal of Part IV is to encourage greater dialogue between aid experts and
trade experts, who have much to learn from each other. Lastly, Part V coalesces
the lessons from the first three parts into a normative roadmap for success, one in
which aid for trade is not a substitute for meaningful changes to WTO multilateral
trade regime, but rather an effective tool both for promoting economic growth and
laying the informational and institutional foundations for effective reform of the
WTO system to ensure it works for both developed and developing nations.
II.

THE HISTORICAL LESSONS

Aid for trade is not new. So long as development agencies have been in
existence, some portion of the aid they oversee has been ear-marked for traderelated projects. While it is beyond the scope of this article to canvass the
complete history of trade-related development aid, it is worthwhile to highlight
some of the trends in such aid since the end of World War II. The broad themes
that emerge are important guideposts in shaping aid for trade programs today.
A. Recipient Countries ofAid had Limited Autonomy
Development aid and trade-targeted aid in the post-World War II era was

8. The first Global Review of Aid for Trade was held at a conference in Geneva on November
20-21, 2007. The objectives of "Mobilizing Aid for Trade: A Global Review" are threefold: (1) Take
stock of what's happening: The global review weaves together various inputs in the monitoring process,
including a discussion on the results and recommendations of the three regional reviews that took place
prior to the Global Review, in Lima, Peru for Latin America and the Caribbean; in Manila, Philippines
for Asia and the Pacific; and in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania for Africa. (2) Identify what should happen
next: The meeting was expected to help develop roadmaps for mainstreaming trade in national
development strategies. For the next steps, partner countries, donors and agencies were encouraged to
identify key objectives and to discuss how these objectives can most effectively be met. (3) Better
monitoring and evaluation: The global review discussed ways of better monitoring and evaluating
progress by partner and donor countries, including efforts to launch a work program aimed at
developing qualitative targets for improving trade capacity. In addition to the Global Review, the WTO
has launched a blog about aid for trade as well as an online chat with Director General Pascal Lamy
about aid for trade. See World Trade Org., Aid for Trade Can Turn Possibilityinto Reality, Lamy Tells
Global Review, Nov. 20, 2007, available at http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/sppl-e/sppl 8le.htm.
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largely donor-run, politically driven, and characterized by a lack of country
ownership. For example, beginning with the Marshall Plan, the United States used
aid in a politically-driven way to advance its Cold War policies - in order to
prevent the spread of communism. 9 Other developed nations subsequently used
aid to ensure "a relatively peaceful transfer of power to independent governments
at the end of colonialism." 10 Recipient nations also exercised little autonomy over
the uses of aid funds. Aid grants often came with political or commercial strings."
It is important for aid for trade not to repeat the mistakes of the past by avoiding
similar problems. Part IV will develop detailed suggestions to ensure aid for trade
is country-driven, politically and commercially untied, and characterized by a high
degree of country ownership.
B. Exclusion of Developing Nationsfrom Meaningful Participationin Multilateral
Trade Negotiations
Until very recently, developing nations played little, or no, role in the shaping
of the global trading system. 12 Immediately in the aftermath of World War II, the
reconstruction of Europe was the number one priority of the victorious allies.
When twenty-three nations, consisting of primarily wealthy but war-ravaged
nations, formed the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) institutions
in 1947, their focus was on the rebuilding of trade linkages among themselves. For
the most part, the developing nations of Asia, Central and South America, and
Africa, many of whom were still under colonial control, were not part of the
calculus. 13 Economic growth and integration were principally goals for Europe,

9. See Pierre de Senarclens, How the United Nations Promotes Development Through Technical
Assistance, in THE POST-DEVELOPMENT READER 190 (Majid Rahnema & Victoria Bawtree eds., 4th ed.
2003) (1997) (noting that just as the Marshall Plan was to contain the communist threat in Europe,
economic aid became part of the American political strategy during the Cold War with respect to other
parts of the world as well).
10. Nicolas Van De Walle, AFRICAN ECONOMIES AND THE POLITICS OF PERMANENT CRISIS,
1979-1999 189 (2001) (describing the crisis of foreign aid in post-independence Africa).
11. See, e.g., Nsongurua J. Udombana, Back to Basics: The ACP-EU Cotonou Trade Agreement
and Challengesfor the African Union, 40 TEX. INT'L L. J. 59, 100 (2004) (arguing that the "increasing
tendencies to impose conditionalities of a political nature for development assistance to Africa has had
unintended but negative consequences.").
12. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Two Principles for the Next Round or, How to Bring Developing
Countries in from the Cold, in DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE WTO: A PRO-ACTIVE AGENDA 7-9
(Bernard Hoekman & Will Martin eds., 2001) (noting that rich countries sometimes play-down the
political imbalances within developing countries); see also Wesley A. Cann, Jr., Creating Standards
and Accountabilityfor the Use of the WTO Security Exception: Reducing the Role of Power-Based
Relations andEstablishing a New Balance Between Sovereignty and Multilateralism, 26 YALE J. INT'L
L 413, 419-20 (2001) (recognizing the special needs of developing countries in the WTO agreements
and arguing that the absence of standards perpetuated by a minority of powerful countries pose a threat
to the security of the entire international trade system).
13. In the aftermath of World War II, fifty countries convened at the Bretton Woods Conference
to create, among other things, the International Trade Organization (ITO), a specialized agency of the
United Nations. Those at the conference hoped that the creation and development of an ancillary
institution dealing solely with trade would decrease obstacles to international trade and give effect to
multilateral nondiscriminatory trade principles. Along with the ITO, the countries created the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
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North America, and Japan, achieved through a series of multilateral trade
liberalization agreements negotiated under the auspices of the GATT. In fact,
developing nations continued to not have a seat at the table for many decades. One
explanation is that the majority of developing nations continued to export only
primary commodities, an area in which the trade regime was already fully
developed and solidified. In fact, with respect to agricultural commodities, the
GATT system was so mature and inflexible that major changes to it critical to the
trade interests of developing nations are being negotiated only now under the Doha
Rounds. The upshot is that developing nations were, and remained for a long time,
marginalized voices in the global trade system. As one scholar has noted:
Instead of aggressively seeking market access in the industrialized
world, these countries defensively sought special and differential
treatment on commitments to open their markets, and they obtained
marginal trade preferences or concessions on a nonreciprocal basis. Not
surprisingly, even while they were "free-riding" by virtue of the
GATT's most favored nation (MFN) 4principle, they received new
concessions of specific interest to them. 1
The history of exclusion of developing countries means that much rides on the
ability of the Doha Development Agenda to both fix and make some amends for
past lack of participation.
C. How Aid for Technical Assistance can be Used Successfully
History does offer one model of success, albeit not from the trade arena.
Commentators are virtually unanimous in hailing the Ozone Convention and
accompanying protocols 15 as a success in the reduction of ozone depleting

(the World Bank). The countries designed the three organizations with three purposes in mind: the IMF
would repair the disintegration of the world economy; the World Bank would stimulate and support
foreign investment; and the ITO would reverse the protectionist and discriminatory trade practices
believed by many to have in part caused the two World Wars. In the fall of 1946, twenty-three of the
countries present at the Bretton Woods Conference formed a provisional agreement, the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). These countries ratified the GATT in 1947 as a permanent
treaty. The original GATT agreement is often referred to as the 1947 GATT. It remains largely in
place today even though many revisions and additions have been made to it. When it came time in
1948 for the formal ratification of the ITO, the U.S. refused to sign the charter and the ITO was aborted.
The GATT was initially signed by twenty-three countries: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Canada,
Ceylon, Chile, China, Cuba, the Czechoslovak Republic, France, India, Lebanon, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Southern Rhodesia, Syria, South Africa, the United

Kingdom, and the U.S.

JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
RELATIONS CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT ON THE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF

TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMiC RELATIONS 200, 199-201, 211 (4th ed. 2002).
14. Jayashree Watal, Developing Countries' Interests in a Development Round, in THE WTO
AFTER SEATTLE 71 (Jeffrey J. Schott ed., 2000) (explaining that for many decades, developing nations
were not significant players in the rounds of multilateral trade negotiations under GATT).
15. Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Mar. 22, 1985, 1513 U.N.T.S.
293[hereinafter the Ozone Convention]. See also John W. Kindt & Samuel P. Menefee, The Vexing
Problem of Ozone Depletion in InternationalEnvironmentalLaw and Policy, 24 TEX. INT'L L. J. 261,
277-82 (1989) (arguing that the Ozone Convention was a success because it provided an umbrella treaty
on the ozone problem along with mechanisms for adopting subsequent protocols for future CFC control
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16
The
cholorofloridecarbons (CFCs), halons, and certain other greenhouse gases.
factors,
to
a
number
of
can
be
attributed
Ozone
Convention
success
of
the
relative
including, among others, the presence of strong public support, widespread
political will, the efforts of the UNEP in consensus building among interested
constituencies including industrial CFC producers,1 7 education, and
implementation, the imposition of measurable milestones and other binding
obligations in the Ozone Convention's progeny. For the purposes of this article,
one characteristic of the ozone regime is especially salient for the aid for trade
discussion, i.e., its technology transfer and technical assistance mechanisms to
enable developing nations to comply with the Ozone Convention.

Certain similarities between the ozone regime and the trade regime are
striking. First, no regime to reduce the emission of ozone-depleting substances
would work without the buy-in of developing nations, in particular of rapidly
industrializing or developing economies like China, India, Brazil, and the former
Soviet republics. Likewise, the world trade regime functions optimally only with
full participation. Second, developing nations felt that developed nations bore the
lion's share of the blame for the ozone problem. After all, industrialized nations
had the benefit of using dirty technologies to fuel their economies for decades. It
seemed both hypocritical and morally wrong to ask developing nations to wean
themselves off such technology, resulting in a slowing of their own development.
The same feeling of moral outrage explains why for many years developing
nations sought special concessions to trading rules.
They felt severely
disadvantaged by having a system in whose creation they played no part imposed
upon them. Third, for developing nations to comply with the emission standards
and milestones of the Ozone Convention, they would need financial, technical, and
technological assistance. Developing nations need similar assistance today to
make the world trade system work for them.
The Multilateral Fund was one of the keystones of the Ozone Convention's
success. It was a brilliant idea, and like many brilliant ideas, it was simple at its
core and complex in its implementation. The Fund was created under the London

measures); Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 26 I.L.M.
1541; Carol A. Petsonk, The Role of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) in the
Development of International Environmental Law, 5 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 351, 367-72 (1990)
(describing the framework of the Montreal Protocol and arguing that it was unique among
environmental agreements because it contains economic incentives to encourage participation and
compliance).
16. See e.g., Elias Mossos, The Montreal Protocol and the Difficulty with InternationalChange,
10 ALB. L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK J. 1, 1-5 (2005); Laura Thoms, A ComparativeAnalysis of International
Regimes on Ozone and Climate Change with Implications for Regime Design, 41 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 795, 802-03 (2003); Michael Weisslitz, Rethinking the EquitablePrinciple of Common
but DifferentiatedResponsibility: Differential Versus Absolute Norms of Compliance and Contribution
in the Global Climate Change Context, 13 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L & POL'Y 473 (2002); 0. Yoshida,
Soft Enforcement of Treaties: The Montreal Protocol'sNoncompliance Procedure and the Functionsof
Internal InternationalInstitutions, 10 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L & POL'Y 95, 96-100 (1999).
17. See Petsonk, supra note 15, at 367 (pointing out that the UNEP took care to involve not only
environmental NGOs, but also industry groups).

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 36:3/4

Amendment to the Montreal Protocol in 1992.18 Developed nations pledged to
contribute money to the Multilateral Fund, which would be disbursed, under the
auspices of an implementation team consisting of both governmental and NGO
representatives at the UN, to developing nations for either retrofitting or cleaning
up ozone depleting industries. The Fund also provided for assistance in kind, in
the form of free technology transfers for new non-polluting industrial chemicals or
methods and know-how and clean-up technologies, which developing countries
might not otherwise be able to afford. The fund was also well designed to mitigate
the North/South conflict, the impasse between developed and developing nations,
which inspired its creation. The rotating membership on the Executive Committee
that oversees fund decision-making, comprised equal numbers of developed and
developing nations' representatives. Decisions are taken by consensus where
possible; if votes must be taken they require a two-thirds majority vote overall,
which also had to consist of a majority among both developed and developing
countries. 19 The fund had the intended effect. China joined immediately in 1990,
followed by India and Brazil in 1992 and eventually by almost all the developing
nations.20 "By early 1999 developed nations had contributed more than $847
million to the fund, and the Executive Committee had approved nearly 3,000
projects ........
Therefore, the Multilateral Fund addressed all three of the problems
highlighted above. It gave tacit acknowledgement to the historical responsibility
developed nations bear for ozone depletion. At the same time, it balanced the need
for uniformity in the application of standards to a transnational problem like the
protection of the environment with the recognition that poorer nations may lack the
resources to remedy such problems. Most critically, the Fund provided the
necessary means to enable developing nations to meet their commitments.
Similarly, a successful aid for trade system must also provide a compelling
framework for developing nations. It too should give implicit or explicit
acknowledge to the historical exclusion of developing nations in decision-making
that shaped the global trade regime. It would reflect the responsibility that
developed nations must now play in bringing in their developing nation
counterparts into the trade regime. It must also provide the resources to allow
developing nations to take full advantage of the global trade regime, including
meaningful participation in its decision-making.

18. London Amendment to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer art.
10, June 29, 1990, 1598 U.N.T.S. 469, 30 I.L.M. 537; see also Elizabeth R. DeSombre, The Experience
of the Montreal Protocol: Particularly Remarkable, and Remarkably Particular, 19 UCLA J. ENVTL.
L. & POL'Y 49, 49-55, 57, 69-76 (2000-01) (describing the Montreal Protocol framework and the
Multilateral Fund as the innovative mechanism that brought in developing nations into the ozone
regulation scheme).
19. Elizabeth R. DeSombre & Joanne Kauffman, The Montreal Protocol Multilateral Fund:
Partial Success Story, in INSTITUTIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL AID: PITFALLS AND PROMISE 89, 99

(1996).
20. DeSombre, supranote 18, at 71.
21. Id.at 71-72.
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In conclusion, the history of trade-related aid, characterized by
marginalization and limited success, has several important implications for aid for
trade policy today. First, developing nations are beginning with a severe
disadvantage, not just in terms of economic and political clout, but in terms of
familiarity with the trade regime and the ability to negotiate its vagaries to their
advantage. There is a great deal of scholarship about the lack of meaningful
participation by developing nations in both trade negotiations and dispute
settlement. 22 It is not my goal to re-play such insights and arguments. Rather, I
wish to merely point out that aid for trade can play a pivotal role in correcting such
historical imbalances. Aid in the form of technical assistance and training focused
on the formulation and implementation of trade policies and on negotiation or
litigation strategies for achieving meaningful changes at the WTO has the potential
to making developing nations real players in the system. Such gains by developing
nations, if widespread and deep, coupled with cooperation among blocs of
developing nations as a negotiation strategy, could lend voice to a historically
disenfranchised group. Such is the promise of aid for trade.
III. AID

FOR TRADE TODAY

Today, the total volume of aid for trade is estimated by the OECD to be about
$25 to $30 billion annually. 23 Most aid for trade is disbursed directly by donors or
disbursed multilaterally through regional finance and development organizations
like the World Bank and the regional development banks.
The WTO participates in a very small distribution of aid for trade funds. It is

not a development or aid agency, and it does not wish to become one. Rather, its
role can best be described as that of a facilitator. The WTO clearly has a role and
22. See generally, William J. Davey, Dispute Settlement in GATT, 11 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 51, 90
(1987) (questioning whether less developed countries will "have the diplomatic or economic muscle to
ensure that the decision is implemented" even if they win their case, based on the United States' past
refusal to implement successful GATT findings against the United States by smaller countries); William
J. Davey, The WTO Dispute Settlement System: The First Ten Years, 8 J. INT'L ECON. L. 17, 24 (2005);
Kara Leitner & Simon Lester, WTO Dispute Settlement 1995-2002: A Statistical Analysis, 6 J. INT'L
ECON. L. 251, 255-56 (2003) (presenting empirical data showing that the WTO dispute settlement
process is often quite slow).
23. The OECD has compiled its estimate based on 2002-2005 data, the most recent years for
which data was available. The four categories of spending in 2005 were divided as follows: "(a) Trade
policy and regulation [which] amounted to roughly $0.9 billion in 2005. This helps build local
capacities of national trade policies, participate in trade negotiations and implement trade agreements.
(b) Building productive capacity amounting to roughly $9.5 billion. This includes trade development
spending targeted at helping enterprises to trade and at creating favorable business climate. (c)
Economic infrastructure spending was $12.1 billion in 2005. This assistance helps countries build the
physical means - transport and storage, communications and energy - to produce and move goods and
export them ....
Since there is no way of breaking out the amount that is strictly trade-related (how
much of a road is used for export trade as opposed to general domestic transport, for example), the total
is treated as a proxy for aid for trade. (d) Another component of the broadest measure of aid for trade is
assistance for trade-related structural adjustment (about $3-6 billion a year). [This is assistance to offset
the costs associated with tariff reductions, loss of industries, or declining terms of trade.]" World Trade
Organization,
Aid
for
Trade
Fact
Sheet,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/devel-e/a4t-e/a4tfactsheet-e.htm
(last visited Feb. 26, 2008)
[hereinafter, Aid for Trade Fact Sheet].
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responsibility for ensuring that countries can effectively participate in, and benefit
from, trade. As such, it has an interest in ensuring that the existing development
mechanisms work together efficiently and synergistically to promote trade. The
WTO was given a specific mandate by its General Council as part of the Uruguay
Round, the so-called Coherence Mandate, to ensure and promote coherence in
global economic policy making.24 The WTO's interest in aid for trade is an
extension, and a test, of the Coherence Mandate.
A. Opportunitiesfor the WTO
As a facilitator, the WTO can play a pivotal role. First, it can work with the
World Bank, the IMF, governmental and NGO donors, regional development
banks, and the U.N. development agencies to deliver a more coordinated
international policy. It can do so by ensuring that aid is directed where it can do
the most good for each recipient country. For instance, while the World Bank may
have particular expertise about the need for certain infrastructure projects (ports or
roads, for example), the WTO might be able to optimize the value of such
infrastructural improvements by coupling it with aid designed to draft and
implement export control regulation. The WTO can assist in coordinating projects
between countries, by ensuring, for example, that our mango farmers in Mali have
good roads not only in Mali, but also through Senegal to the western port of Dakar
or through the C6te d'Ivoire to the southern port of Abidjan.
However, these types of advising roles, while important, are not the areas in
which the WTO can have the greatest impact. The WTO can, and currently does,
play an important role in providing more and better aid for trade. It does so in two
major ways - advocacy and assessment. The 2005 Ministerial Meeting in Hong
Kong set in motion both steps by establishing a two-track process. First, Director
General Lamy engaged in a series of consultations with partner development
organizations on securing additional financial resources in aid for trade. The result
was a Ministerial Meeting affirmation by donors of their commitment to step up
their aid for trade contributions.25 The United States, the European Union, and
Japan made specific pledges to increase their aid for trade contributions. The
consultations also made clear that a number of new and non-traditional donors,
including some developing nations, were willing to be part of the process. This
advocacy role continues to be a critical one for the WTO to play because of its
linkages with donor governments and development agencies. It is ideally placed to
lobby for broadening and deepening the donor pool for aid for trade.
Step two of the two-track process consisted of the creation of a Task Force to
advise on how best to deliver any additional funding for aid for trade. The Task
Force issued a report in October of 2006 that was endorsed by the WTO's General
24. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation art. IlI, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867

U.N.T.S. 154, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/04-wto.pdf. See World Trade
Organization,
Task
Force,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/devel-e/a4t-e/implementing-par57_e.htm (last visited Feb. 26,
2008).
25. See World Trade Org., WTO to Press for Additional Aid for Trade Resources, September 18,
2006, available at http://www.wto.org/English/news-e/sppl-e/sppl36_e.htm (last visited May 8, 2008).
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Council. 26 The report set out a series of recommendations for optimizing aid for
trade. In particular, it called for strengthening the demand side, improving the
donor response, and closing the gap between demand and response at the country,
regional, and global level. It also suggested that the WTO should take a lead in
monitoring and evaluating aid for trade. The WTO heeded the suggestion and
initiated a three-part monitoring system. First, the OECD undertook a global
report on aid for trade. Next, donor and recipient-country monitoring took shape
in the form of self-evaluations. All three assessments would be examined in an
annual conference and debate in the WTO General Council, the first of which took
place in November 2007.
Both the advocacy and monitoring roles are obviously quite important. For
instance, since the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration in 2005, annual
27
contributions for building productive capacity have increased by 75 percent.
Monitoring on a global level enables better decision-making in the investment of
aid for trade funds. More information and transparency generally leads to more
informed policies at both the donor and recipient country levels. Coordination in
monitoring is also a crucial first step towards greater coordination in the
implementation of regional or global aid for trade policies.
However, aid for trade also creates a great opportunity for the WTO to
enhance its own transparency and increase its democratic participation. The WTO
has been criticized by many for being secretive, non-transparent, and unsusceptible
to democratic oversight. Critics point to many shortcomings, such as the lack of
NGO and citizen participation in the trade negotiation process, and the total
absence of methods for interested parties like consumers, trade unions, and
advocacy groups to be heard in cases in the dispute settlement process.2 8 While
26. See World Trade Org., Development: Aid for Trade: Task Force, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/deveLe/a4t-e/implementing-par57_e.htm (last visited May 8,
2008)
27. See Aid for Trade Fact Sheet, supra note 23. However, it is not possible to determine if this
increase represents a net increase in donor giving for all development purposes, including aid for trade,
or is merely a reallocation of existing donor commitments for aid.
28. The Appellate Body did briefly accept amicus briefs in WTO dispute proceedings, but has
drawn back from the position after a loud outcry by member nations. According to the Appellate Body,
the panels' comprehensive authority to seek information from any relevant source (Article 13 of the
DSU) and to add to or depart from the Working Procedures in Appendix 3 to the DSU (Article 12.1 of
the DSU) permits panels to accept and consider or to reject information and advice, even if submitted in
an unsolicited fashion. The Appellate Body has confirmed this ruling several times, but the issue
remains extremely contentious among WTO Members. See Appellate Body Report, United States Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 105-108, WT/DS58/AB/R (Nov. 6, 1998)
[hereinafter US - Shrimp]. Many Members are of the strong view that the DSU does not allow panels
to accept and consider non-requested amicus curiae submissions. They consider WTO disputes as
procedures purely between Members and see no role whatsoever for non-parties, particularly NGOs.
The statements of these Members can be found in the minutes of the Dispute Settlement Body ("DSB")
in which the DSB adopted the US- Shrimp panel (and Appellate Body) report. To date, only a few
panels have in fact made use of their discretionary right to accept and consider unsolicited briefs. On
the basis of the Appellate Body's interpretation, panels have no obligation whatsoever to accept and
consider these briefs. Accordingly, interested entities, which are neither parties nor third parties to the
dispute, have no legal right to be heard by a panel. Id.
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deliberations during multilateral rounds of negotiations are conducted in public,
many critics allege that many critical provisions are hammered out in "late night
secret" negotiation sessions among key players. 29 These, and other perceived
failings by the WTO, can be summed up in the phrase "democratic deficit," which
has become a touchstone of dissatisfaction about the WTO. 30 These criticisms are
valid and should be taken seriously because they may ultimately erode the WTO's
legitimacy.
In the international economic literature, discussion of the WTO's democratic
deficit is contextualized within the broader so-called constitutionalization debate.
The term constitutionalization came into use with regard to the WTO in 1995, at
end of Uruguay Round, invoking both fears (loss of sovereignty) and hopes (the
ability to "exert control over decisions the State makes, the democratic community
itself'). 31 There is wide-spread disagreement within the literature about the
precise meaning of constitutionalization or constitutionalism, 32 similar to the

29. For example, critical negotiations surrounding the language of the standard of review
provision (Article 17.6) in the Anti-dumping Agreement was resolved in a late-night session. See
Phoenix X.F. Cai, Between Intensive Care and the Crematorium: Using the Standard of Review to
Restore Balance to the WTO, 15 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 465, 488 (2007).
30. For a thoughtful discussion of the global democratic deficient in general, not specific to the
WTO, see generally Andrew Strauss, Considering Global Democracy, An Introduction to the
Symposium: Envisioning a More Democratic Global System, 13 WIDENER L. REV.(2006-2007);
Gregory H. Fox, InternationalizingNational Politics: Lessons for International Organizations, 13
WIDENER L. REV. 265 (2007).
The literature on the democratic deficient in the WTO is quite
extensive. See generally Jeffery Atik, Democratizing the WTO, 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 451
(2001); Steve Chamovitz, The WTO and Cosmopolitics, 7 J. INT'L ECON. L. 675 (2004); Robert Howse,
How to Begin to Think About the 'DemocraticDeficit' at the WTO, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
GOVERNANCE AND NON-ECONOMIC CONCERNS 79, 91 (Stefan Griller ed., 2003) (critiquing WTO
procedure); Joel P. Trachtman, The Constitutions of the WTO, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 623 (2006). In
contrast, Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann advocates constitutionalization from a human rights point of view,
even arguing that the WTO's mandatory dispute settlement system should be a model for the United
Nations. See, e.g., Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, How to Reform the UN System? Constitutionalism,
InternationalLaw, and InternationalOrganizations, 10 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 421 (1997); Emst-Ulrich
Petersmann, How to Reform the United Nations: Lessons from the International Economic Law
Revolution, 2 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 185 (1997-98); Emst-Ulrich Petersmann, How to
ConstitutionalizeInternationalLaw and Foreign Policy for the Benefit of Civil Society?, 20 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 1 (1998); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, How to Reform the United Nations? Lessons from the
"InternationalEconomic Law Revolution," 53 AUSSENWIRTSCHAFT: SCHWEIZERISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT
FOR INTERNATIONALE WIRTSCHAFTSBEZIEHUNGEN [Swiss REV. INT'L ECON. REL.] 193 (1998); ErnstUlrich Petersmann, Dispute Settlement in InternationalEconomic Law - Lessons for Strengthening
InternationalDispute Settlement in Non-Economic Areas, 2 J. INT'L ECON. L. 189 (1999); Ernst-Ulrich
Petersmann, Constitutionalism and International Adjudication: How to Constitutionalize the UN.
Dispute Settlement System? 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 753 (1999).
31.

Deborah Z. Cass, THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION:

16 (2005).
32. Some international trade lawyers take constitutionalization of the WTO to refer to increasing
strength of the institutional structure. See, e.g., JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION:
CONSTITUTION AND JURISPRUDENCE 6, 14 (1998). Others believe constitutionalization in the WTO
context refers to the deepening of rights penetration into national legal systems. See. e.g., ERNSTULRICH PETERSMANN, THE GATT/WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM (1997). Yet others distinguish
between a "structural" form focusing on matters such as division of powers, or establishment of
LEGITIMACY, DEMOCRACY, AND COMMUNITY IN THE INTERNATIONAL TRADING SYSTEM
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33
confusion over the meaning of the same terms within the European Union.
These divergent views can best be reconciled with the observation that
"constitutionalism and constitutionalisation are... not... black- and-white, all-ornothing terms [but are questions] of nuance and gradation. 34 Moreover, no
commentators seem to seriously doubt that the WTO has already embarked on a
course of constitutionalization, they just disagree as to scope and degree. Among
those who accept the constitutionalization discourse, there seems to be some
agreement that participation by a broad spectrum of civil society actors is both a
definitional characteristic of constitutionalization and a core part of its success.
For instance, according to one respected scholar, three (out of seven) of the indices
of constitutionalization institutional structure, specification of conditions and
incidents of membership, and terms of representation of membership - all speak to
the question of democratic participation, in one way or another.35
The WTO performs relatively weakly on each of these three indices of
democratic participation. On institutional structure, the WTO is completely stateactor focused, with state actors acting in both legislative and executive capacities,
through respectively the Ministerial Conference (consisting of all members acting
in a legislative capacity) and the General Counsel (again consisting of all members
acting in an executive capacity).
There are no formal mechanisms for
representative decision-making or formal civil society involvement. With respect
to specification of conditions and incidents of membership, aside from certain
broad concepts like Most Favored Nation treatment,36 none are specified or
understood before-hand, but are instead subject to individualized negotiation
culminating in the terms and conditions of accession. Again, with respect to the
terms of representation of membership, there are no formal mechanisms, and civil
society actors are not given a formal role or means of giving input.

institutions for representation, and between a "material" form in which obstacles to free trade are
eliminated. See, e.g., J. H. H. Weiler, Epilogue: Towards a Common Law of InternationalTrade, in
THE EU, THE WTO, AND THE NAFTA: TOWARDS A COMMON LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE? 201,
206 (J. H. H. Weiler ed., 2000).
33. For a discussion of some of the multiple meanings of the term in the European Union context,
see, e.g., Gilnter Frankenberg, The Return of the Contract: Problems and Pitfalls of European
Constitutionalism, 6 EUR. L. J. 257 (2000) (arguing that the meaning varies depending on whether a
constitution is perceived as a contract, political manifesto, plan/program, or statute).
34. Neil Walker, The EU and the WTO: Constitutionalism in a New Key, in THE EU AND THE
WTO: LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 31, 35 (Grdinne de Bflrca & Joanne Scott, eds., 2001).
Walker argues there are seven indices of constitutionalization: explicit constitutional discourse, a claim
to foundational legal authority, jurisdictional scope, interpretative autonomy, institutional structure,
specification of conditions and incidents of membership, and terms of representation of membership.
Id. at 35.
35. Id. at 35.
36. At its most basic level, most-favored-nation treatment means non-discrimination between
countries. See generally, Martin Domike & John N. Hazard, State Trading and the Most-FavoredNation Clause, 52 AM. J. INT'L L. 55 (1958). See also World Trade Org., WTO: Seattle Misinformation,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/minist-e/min 9 9-e/english/misinf-e/7ineq-e.htm (last visited
Feb. 17, 2008) (providing a more colloquial description of the principle).
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Professor Cass has argued convincingly that traditionally constitutionalization
consists of six elements:
1.

[A] set of social practices to constrain economic and political
behavior...

2.

[A] belief that a new foundational device or Grundnorm has emerged
such that what was once merely a set of rules is transformed into a
coherent and unified body of rules with the appearance of a new
system of law...

3.

[A] political community to authorize its making and that the
community's interests are represented...

4.

[A] process of deliberative law-making...

5.

Some realignment of the relationship between the sub-entities and
the central, putatively constitutionalized entity...

6.

37
[A] level of social acceptance, or legitimacy of the process itself.

Under Professor Cass' formulation, the WTO falls short in the same ways, in
the areas of representation and deliberative law-making, with the most prominent
failure being the lack of participation by some developing nation members.
The constitutionalization debate is a rich and complex one. It shall no doubt
provide fertile ground for international law scholars for many, many decades. In
this short article, I wish to make only one modest contribution to the debate.
Whatever the form or direction constitutionalization may take in the WTO in the
coming years, it must first confront head-on the problem of developing nations.
They must not be left out of the process. Today, the WTO has 151 member
nations. 38 Two-thirds of them are developing nations. 39 They hold a large stake in
the WTO and the WTO's future success will depend on them to a great extent.
Any opening for greater participation by developing countries in the rule-making,
institutional-building, implementation and adjudicative functions of the WTO must
be fully exploited.
How can aid for trade play a part in facilitating the participation of developing
nations? Aid for trade enables the WTO to reach out to a broader community,
including many who have historically been excluded from participation in the
world trade regime. The most obvious constituency comprises developing nations,
the recipients of aid for trade. Each project successfully completed brings a
developing country closer into the fold of the world trade regime. While each
project may not bring great leaps in economic integration by itself, it does
represent one more baby step in the right direction. At a minimum, each aid for
trade project opens channels of communication about the particular needs of the
37. See

Cass,

supra note

31,

at

19

(listing

the

traits

of the received

account

of

constitutionalization) (bullet numbers added).
38. World Trade Org., Understanding the WTO - Members and Observers,
http://www.wto.org/englishlthewto e/whatis e/tif e/org6 e.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2008).
Overview,
WTO
the
Org.,
Understanding
Trade
39. World
http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatis-e/tif e/devle.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2008).
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developing country and available resources to meet those needs. Beyond that, each
project allows key actors to learn about each other. For example, in a productive
capacity project, in-country government officials may become familiar with the
inner workings of a regional development bank disbursing the funding. They may
also learn a great deal about the necessary domestic regulatory changes to comply
with the WTO's regulatory regime. Involved industry leaders learn how to make
their products safe for export and navigate the complex customs and tariffs system,
which information may be passed on to other sectors and leaders. These types of
informational flows are critical to the acquisition of intellectual capital that can be
no less valuable than the financial capital invested.
Another important constituency consists of other multilateral agencies, like
the World Bank, the IMF, and most importantly, the United Nations. The WTO
has traditionally worked relatively closely with both the World Bank and the IMF
in terms of coordinating monetary, trade, and economic policy. However, aid for
trade requires even tighter cooperation, often at the local and regional level.
Engaging in such cooperation lies clearly within the WTO's Coherence Mandate.
With respect to the U.N., however, the WTO does not have such a clear
relationship. However, that doesn't mean the relationship would not a desirable
one.
The WTO should leverage its involvement with aid for trade to actively seek
closer ties with the U.N. In order to carry out the coordination and monitoring
tasks given to it by the General Council, the WTO must interface with the U.N.
Development Agencies. However, it should go beyond that, to seek support for
and input on aid for trade from the General Assembly. It can do so by asking one
of its member nations, one that is also a member of the General Assembly, to put
forth a resolution, similar to the one adopted by the Hong Kong Ministerial
Conference in 2005, affirming the commitment to aid for trade. Such a resolution
should pass quite easily. Its value lies in the legitimization function of a U.N.
resolution. A motion of support coming from the largest, oldest, and most
respected multilateral organization would not only draw attention to the WTO's
laudable efforts in promoting aid for trade, but also send an important signal to the
General Assembly. That signal would be that the WTO does value the input and
support of a body that is now largely made up of developing nations. 40 Moreover,
resolutions in the U.N. are often valued for their moral and persuasive force, which
would only re-enforce the value of aid for trade.
The WTO can also advance its monitoring function by soliciting in-country
self-assessment reports at the General Assembly. Only seven self-assessments
were submitted as part of the 2007 Global Review, 4' a very small fraction of the
number of countries that received some form of aid for trade. A bit of spurring
40. The General Assembly has 192 members, of whom approximately two-thirds are developing
nations. United Nations Gen. Assembly, U.N. GeneralAssembly: Functions and Powers of the General
Assembly, http://www.un.org/ga/about/background.shtml (last visited Feb. 17, 2008),
41. World Trade Org. & The Org. for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Aid For Trade
at A
Glance 2007 First Global Review
at
49
(2007),
available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/devel-e/a4t-e/a4tata.glance07_e.pdf.
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from the General Assembly may lead to more voluntary self-reporting. This is
likely because there is some evidence that in the General Assembly, peer pressure,
especially among regional blocs of nations, can translate into real action.42
Most critically, aid for trade brings the WTO into contact with a constituency
with whom it has not engaged in dialogue previously NGOs, advocacy groups,
and local citizens' groups. As previously mentioned, critics have decried the lack
of direct access to the WTO's proceedings and deliberations by interested nongovernmental entities. Unfortunately, aid for trade can not completely redress the
asymmetries in the WTO decision-making process - the WTO is unlikely to
abandon its state-oriented approach any time soon.
Nonetheless, aid for trade does provide some avenues for the traditionally
disenfranchised to be heard. Because the WTO is not a development agency, it
needs the input of experts in both development and aid. NGOs, advocacy groups,
industry associations, citizens' advocacy groups, and other similar civil society
organizations could play a potentially pivotal role. By participating in aid for trade
projects, either as beneficiaries, advisors, facilitators, or monitors, grassroots
organizations would gain an important toe-hold at the WTO. Granted, the toe-hold
may be small, but it must be exploited nonetheless. No similar foothold has
become available in the last fifty years of the WTO's existence. Thus, it represents
a unique and valuable opportunity.
How might NGOs and others interface with the WTO in connection with aid
for trade? Let's go back to the Malian mango farmers hypothetical at the
beginning of the article for some illustrative examples. Recall that one of the
obstacles we posited was lack of expertise about the health and safety inspections
required to export to Europe. A two-pronged approach is required to address this
problem. First, Mali needs to be able to formulate a set of domestic policies to
implement the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement, the WTO agreement that
deals with health and safety issued related to agricultural and food products.43
Second, health inspection personnel need to be trained in operationalizing and
enforcing the new policies.
What would the WTO gain from greater cooperation with NGOs? The
answer is a great deal. First, the WTO would gain legitimacy in the eyes of NGOs
with whom it collaborates in aid for trade projects. Many NGOs are skeptical of
the WTO's ability to reach out to civil society organizations. Aid for trade projects
provide a means to de-fuse some of the skepticism. Second, opening channels of
communications with NGOs initially, with respect to specific aid for trade projects,
will hopefully lead to the establishment of some permanent avenues of dialog, a
result that the current Director General would welcome. Lastly, aid for aid
provides a chance to receive informal input from NGOs which might shape policy
at the multilateral level. NGOs possess a valuable base of knowledge about the
42. For example, the G77, a coalition of 77 founding developing nation members which now has
132 members, has coordinated opposition against weighted voting in the General Assembly. See
Editorial, Resolving the U.N. Power Struggle, 184 N.J. L. J. 410 (2006).
43. See infra note 91.
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needs of developing nations that might guide in creative solutions or compromises
to move the Doha Round forward. If closer cooperation with NGOs through aid
for trade initiatives yields ideas for putting the Doha Round back on track, then it
would be well worth the effort.
B. Limits ofAid for Trade
No matter how effective aid for trade is, or becomes, it can be no substitute
for a successful Doha Round. No matter the scope, aid for trade is fundamentally a
form of triage. Elements of it should and will remain in effect for a long time,
even after the conclusion of the Doha Round and the next round of multilateral
negotiations, because some developing nations will continue to need transitional
and development assistance. However, aid for trade fails to accomplish the types
of structural changes necessary to meaningfully advance the interests of developing
nations.
In order to understand this, some background regarding the history of the
Doha Round, and the nature of multilateralism at the WTO, is necessary. As
previously stated, industrialized nations dominated the agenda and policies of the
GATT regime for many decades. It was not until the creation of the WTO in 1994,
at the end of the Uruguay Round, that a significant change took place in the nature
of participation by developing countries. 4 Even though developing nations were
not happy with many of the results of the Uruguay Round,45 the shift in their
attitude towards multilateralism represented a watershed. Instead of seeking
special concessions as they had in the past, developing nation participants choose
to strike bargains on the basis of reciprocity, and thereby become fully a part of the
trading system.46 The willingness to play by the rules of a game in which they
were little more than spectators in the past is significant in another sense. It
suggests that developing nations saw themselves as having a stake in the success of
the multilateral trading system and desired a role in shaping its evolution. 47 The
benefits of a transparent and rule-based trading system, rather than a power-based
one, coupled with an effective dispute settlement system, are arguably stronger for
developing nations than for powerful industrialized ones. 4 ' Developing nations

44. See The World Bank, GlobalEconomic Prospects and the Developing Countries, at xi (2002),
available
at
http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/extemal/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2002/02/16/000094946_020202041
1334/additional/310436360 20050012014722.pdf (discussing the background information of past
negotiations, focusing on the type and number of participating countries).
45. See Watal, supra note 14, at 72 (explaining that low market access payoffs and the heavy
burden of implementing certain WTO agreements made developing nations believe they were not
gaining much from the Uruguay Round).
46. As one trade scholar elaborated, "[b]y and large, they committed themselves to lowered
industrial and agricultural tariffs, accepted stringent disciplines in new areas such as intellectual
property, and opened up some of their services sectors in return for improved and more secure market
access for their exports, particularly for agricultural products and clothing." Id. at 71.
47. See A.V. Ganesan, Seattle and Beyond: Developing-Country Perspectives, in THE WTO
AFTER SEATTLE 85, 85 (Jeffrey J. Schott ed., 2000) (describing the developing countries' view of the
importance of their active participation in multilateral trade negotiations).
48. Id. (describing the type of trading system developing nations would prefer and benefit from
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also pragmatically understand the rationale for open trade and the necessity of
expanding the multilateral trade agenda. 49 However, they also have some serious,
and justified, reservations about the current course of such agenda.50
When developing nations arrived in Doha, they had some serious qualms
about the multilateral system. They felt that it had become less fair and less
responsive to their development concerns; that the trade agenda was expanding to
address only issues relevant to developed nations; that the multilateral rules were
increasingly becoming no more than codifications of existing rules and laws
prevalent in developed countries, but which are inappropriate or unenforceable in
developing countries. 51 These fears were so prevalent, that a group of like-minded
developing countries actually opposed the launching of a new round of multilateral
negotiations at Doha. Despite recognizing the potential benefits of a new round,
these nations feared that (i) they would be the main targets for extracting
concessions in any new round; (ii) the round would take up subjects of interest to
developing countries which would be irrelevant to their concerns; and (iii) the
subjects which had been of interest to them for a long time would get ignored, as
the focus of the WTO would shift to the new issues initiated in the round. 52 Other
developing nations supported the launching of a new round because they felt that
these and, and other pressing problems,53 could be addressed only through
comprehensive negotiations and bargaining.
As we can see from the above discussion about the launching of the Doha
Round, the priorities and interests of developing nations are not monolithic.
Rather, they are marked by variety and even divergence.54 The pivotal substantive
issues of concern to developing nations fall into several categories. The first, of
critical importance, is to secure greater market access for their goods and
services. 55 Within this broad context, developing nations sought both the faithful

the most).
49. Id. (arguing that developing nations understand the need for trade agenda expansion).
50. Id. (detailing the concerns of developing nations about the evolution of the trade system and
noting that developing countries are apprehensive that developed nations are influencing new rounds of
negotiation too much).
51. See International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, Like Minded Group Sets Out
Positions Before Doha, 5 BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG. 26 (2001), available at
http://www.ictsd.org/html/weekly/10-07-01/story2.htm (listing the members of the Like-Minded Group
as Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Egypt, Honduras, Indonesia, India, Jamaica, Kenya, Malaysia, Sri
Lanka, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zimbabwe).
52. See id. (clarifying the Like-Minded Group's position that even if progress is made on
implementation issues of concern to them, it does not guarantee that the group would participate in the
negotiations).
53. See Jeffrey J. Schott, The WTO After Seattle, in THE WTO AFTER SEATTLE 3, 15-16 (Jeffrey J.
Schott ed., 2000) (listing the numerous issues of developing nations that could only be addressed
through the Ministerial Conference negotiations at a new round).
54. See BHAGIRATH LAL DAS, THE WTO AGREEMENTS: DEFICIENCIES, IMBALANCES AND
REQUIRED CHANGES, at xi (1998) (stating that some researchers believe that the developing nations are
so diverse that they should not be joined together as a group for analysis for negotiating purposes).
55. See Ganesan, supra note 47, at 85 (stating that the central element of developing nations'
strategy is to gain market access in order to compete in the global marketplace).
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execution of commitments made in the Uruguay Round by developed nations
(particularly with respect to subsidies and export supports) as well as increased
flexibility in the implementation of WTO rules on their own part.56 The second
category consists of numerous technical implementation issues relating to the
separate agreements on textiles and clothing, anti-dumping, the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property ("TRIPS"), as well as the built-in
agenda items relating to agriculture, services, and intellectual property.
Developing nations pushed (and continue to push heavily) for further reductions of
domestic farm subsidies, elimination of export supports, and substantial reductions
in agricultural tariffs, particularly for com, sugar, and cotton. With respect to
services, developing nations sought greater movement of labor. With respect to
TRIPS, they advocated for both the correction of perceived imbalances in the
agreement as well as substantial reviews of the existing accord. Lastly, they were
very concerned, even apprehensive, about the incorporation of non-trade issues,
like environmental and labor standards, within the WTO.
All of the listed issues can only be addressed at the level of ministerial
negotiations. No amount of aid for trade can address these issues. To give a
simplified example, no amount of aid for trade targeted at productive capacity
building and infrastructural projects will help our hypothetical Malian mango
farmers who wish to export to Europe if the European Union subsidizes its
domestic mango producers (if any) directly. The mangos from Mali simply would
not be price competitive with subsidized European mangoes. The removal of such
a subsidy must be done through comprehensive negotiations, in which not only the
European Union, but also the U.S., Canada, Japan, and other core markets all agree
to remove their agricultural subsidies. In order to achieve the type of structural
changes developing nations hope for in the WTO, developing nations must play an
active role in current and future rounds of negotiations. Aid for trade, can never be
a substitute for active, meaningful, and sustained participation in the multilateral
process.
IV. CONFLICTS BETWEEN AID AND TRADE

While the potential synergies between aid and trade are substantial, the two
are locked in an uneasy marriage, characterized by a marked lack of
communication and even apparent conflict. Experts in both fields have failed to
communicate with each other. The academic scholarship in both aid and trade has
grown up in isolation, with little to no dialogue between the two disciplines. Yet,
the two fields overlap in many ways and have much to learn from one another.
One of the goals of this section is to start the conversation by pointing out ways in
which aid for trade can be structured so as to benefit from research done in both
disciplines. I hope that as aid for trade continues to be important, more
opportunities for cross-disciplinary work will arise.
Both historically and currently, the focus of aid organizations has been
poverty reduction and alleviation. The poverty reduction aims of the Millennium
56. See id. at 87 (arguing that increased flexibility in the application and definition of rules would
help developing nations create plans that meet their particular needs).
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Development Goals,5 7 the official U.N. targets for aid announced by Secretary

General Kofi Annan in 1999, centers around social spending. Donors and aid
organization have shifted their attention firmly to social spending, rather than
infrastructural spending.58 Since the 1990's, development aid seems to be driven
more by notions of human capital investment and human freedom rather than
economic development. 59 In contrast, trade policy seeks to spur economic
development, and thereby reduce poverty, primarily through trade liberalization
and exports, not social assistance. From the aid side, aid applications and reports
rarely mention trade. 6° On the trade side, trade experts and theorists do not
consider aid because its volume is so small compared to the volume of trade.
Moreover, the economic theory underlying trade, favoring free market mechanisms
over governmental intervention and planning, is somewhat at odds with aid. To
compound the divide, aid officials and trade ministers tend to work separately,
occasionally at cross purposes.61 Similarly, the literatures on trade and aid
respectively rarely cross-fertilize.62 This section gives a flavor of the major
strands of potential conflict between aid and trade in order to highlight what the
two fields have to learn from each other. Each of these conflicts is chosen both for
their import in terms of policy setting as well as for their value in interdisciplinary
cross-fertilization of ideas.
Trade scholars need to understand the underlying architecture of the new aid
thinking to ensure that their contributions to the future of aid for trade will be
thoughtful, well-informed, and grounded. Every new house needs to be built on a
solid foundation. Trade scholarship must be informed by the existing rich body of
aid scholarship and vice versa. It is time for the two disciplines to talk to each
other. Aid for trade provides the ideal forum for those conversations to take place.

57. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are eight goals to be achieved by 2015 that
respond to the main development challenges facing the developing world. They are (1) eradicate
extreme poverty and hunger, (2) achieve universal primary education, (3) promote gender equality and
empower women, (4) reduce child mortality, (5) improve maternal health, (6) combat HIV/AIDS,
malaria and other diseases, (7) ensure environmental sustainability, and (8) develop a Global
Partnership for Development. See United Nations Development Programme, Millennium Development
Goals, http://www.undp.org/mdg/basics.shtml (last visited Feb. 23, 2008).
58. David Booth, Is the New Aid Agenda Anti-Trade? in TRADE AND AID: PARTNERS OR RIVALS
INDEVELOPMENT POLICY? at 41-42 (Sheila Page ed., 2006) (arguing that big infrastructure became less
important than social sector spending in mainstream aid thinking in the 1990's due to both ideological
and practical reasons).
59. See Amartya Sen, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999) (proposing a model of economic
development focused on the flourishing of human potential and freedom).
60. Sheila Page, Bringing Aid and Trade Together, in TRADE AND AID: PARTNERS OR RIVALS IN
DEVELOPMENT POLICY? 11, I1 (Sheila Page ed., 2006) (stating that early Poverty Reduction Strategy
Papers, country studies that were required for World Bank assistance, mostly did not consider the role
of trade).
61. See id.
62. See id. at 30. One of the reasons this article has relatively few footnotes is because there are
so few (virtually none) articles that discuss aid for trade in a systematic way, much less draw from both
the aid and trade literatures.
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A. High Levels ofAid Makes Trade Harder
Ironically, aid inflows can make trade more difficult for a developing country.
Aid is a cash influx, usually of foreign currency, which affects a country's balance
of payments. The increase in the available pool of foreign currency (supply)
inevitably leads to a decrease in price (demand). Specifically, in order to cope
with the increase in the supply of foreign currency, there is an upward pressure on
the value of the domestic currency.63 Higher domestic currency valuations render
that country's exports more expensive, and therefore less competitive. Exporting
and trading becomes more difficult. Moreover, for exporters (or for domestic
producers competing with imports, which are now a little bit cheaper), the change
in the exchange rate reduces the profit they can expect, measured in terms of
domestic currency. For large, diversified, and multinational exporters, the effect
might be de minimus, but that is not so for small-scale and localized firms who do
not have the means to hedge against currency fluctuations. Therefore, aid can not
only make trading more difficult, but also, in some cases, less profitable.
Aid can also distort the local economy in other ways. In addition to the
currency distortions discussed above, economists have identified "Dutch Disease"
as a particularly harmful risk.64 Dutch Disease refers to the adjustment costs in an
economy in which the inflow of finds is temporary. It was first used to describe
the effects of the discovery of natural gas resources in the Netherlands.65 When
the inflow of capital is temporary, it becomes more difficult to set a long-term
development plan. As with permanent capital inflows (derived from changes in
trade, say, new exports), the economy has to restructure itself in order to
accommodate the new flow of capital, by shifting away from the existing pattern of
production to the new one (involving exports). There may be some difficult
adjustment costs, including potential social displacement, but at least it should
occur only once. However, when the change is not permanent (as in aid), both the
public and private adjustment mechanisms become more uncertain and costly. The
economy must accommodate the new flow of capital in the same way. But, it must
do so again once the flow stops, shifting to yet another pattern of production.
Likewise, the public policy challenges are greater as well, as decision-makers have

63. This assumes that the domestic currency is strong relative to the foreign currency transferred
via aid. More realistically for many developing countries, the result is not so much an increase in the
valuation of the domestic currency, but rather an evening out, such that the domestic currency falls less
relative to the foreign currency than it otherwise would. The result, however, on the cost of exports, is
still the same. Trading becomes a little harder.
64. The term "Dutch Disease" originated during the 1960s in reference to the natural gas
discoveries in the North Sea which led to an appreciation of Dutch real exchange rates and subsequent
adverse effects on Dutch manufacturing. See W.M. Corden, Booming Sector and Dutch Disease
Economics: Survey and Consolidation, 36 Oxford Economic Papers No. 3, at 359 (1984); Christine
Ebrahim-zadeh, Dutch Disease: Too Much Wealth Managed Unwisely, 40 FIN. AND DEV.No. 1 (2003).
65. Even though the name is derived from the Dutch experience with natural gas, the Dutch
example is less temporary than most examples. While natural gas exploitation is in fact temporary, in
the sense that it is a non-renewable, finite resource, one that the Netherlands, a small country, will
eventually run out of, it is nonetheless less temporary than aid inflows, which could end more abruptly
and unpredictably.

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 36:3/4

to grapple with the social costs of the adjustment multiple times. The setting of
long-term development agenda becomes more difficult due to uncertainty in the
flow of funds and inability to predict the social costs once aid stops. Even though
policy-makers try their best to maximize the benefits of the aid without incurring
unnecessary costs of adjustment, they may not be able do so effectively.
However, one should not exaggerate the effects of Dutch Disease. If aid
flows are temporary in the medium rather than the short term, and if the economy
needed to be jolted out of its existing patterns of production in order to develop,
then the increase in costs of adjustments may not be that significant.66 Even if aid
flows are one-time payments, the benefits of aid that spurs economic development
or leads to a reduction in poverty may ultimately outweigh the costs of
adjustments, unless all the aid is squandered. Dutch disease67may be in fact less a
disease than a "Discount: the benefits from aid are reduced.,
Trade experts and scholars can learn much from the experience of aid
specialists with exchange rate fluctuation and Dutch Disease. I think there are
clear prescriptions for structuring aid for trade to minimize or avoid both problems.
With respect to Dutch Disease, any aid for trade project should explicitly
incorporate a discount rate for effectiveness to account for the adjustment costs of
the aid. Making the discount explicit is important for the proper calibration of
donor expectations.
Donors, both private and governmental, can become
discouraged and lower their aid commitments if they do not see the results they
hope to achieve. Setting more realistic expectations about the effects of aid may
help keep donors in the game and attract more donors. It may also enhance public
acceptance of aid as a longer term endeavor.
Aid literature has also shown that the impact of Dutch Disease is greatest
where aid is temporary, and much less severe if medium to long term. This
suggests that where possible, aid for trade endeavors should be structured for the
medium to longer term. Obviously, this is not possible for all projects, such as
technical assistance to bring a developing country into compliance with WTO rules
within the deadline negotiated in that country's accession agreement. Such
projects are time-sensitive and should not be spread out. Others can, and should,
be treated differently. For example, infrastructural projects could be "packaged"
together and disbursed over time with the input of the receiving country. Thus, a
donor might pledge $50 million over a period of five years for the construction of
roads. The recipient, with the assistance of the donor and the disbursing agency,
would decide how and when to spend the money, focusing on strategic needs
(build near ports and transport hubs first), social needs (build in the poorest regions
first), or economic needs (build closest to the area with a critical mass of
manufactured goods suitable for exports first) as determined by the recipient
country. Giving the recipient country the ability to make spending decisions is
critical because it removes some of the uncertainty and unpredictability problems
described above. By being able to allocate resources over a period of time to meet
66. See Page, supra note 60, at 23.
67. Id.
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local strategic, social, or economic needs, the recipient is better able to make
longer term development plans as well.
The solution for the exchange rate/balance of payments problem is much
thornier. There is no simple solution - the best prescription is to be attentive to the
effects in setting policy, setting aside a portion of aid to deal with the currency
evaluation fluctuation effects. One way to do this is to set aside a portion of aid to
use to counter-act such costs, essentially the equivalent of adjustment assistance
for workers maintained by the U.S. Department of Labor. 6 8
B. The Role of the State
Anther tension is trade-targeted aid is that donors want to control how their
money is spent (only for trade related capacity building projects, for example).
However, too much donor control may be counter-productive. The aid literature
seems to be unanimous in the view that the role of the aid recipient state is critical
to development success. 69 For instances, studies of the success of the newly
industrial countries in Asia (Korea and Thailand in particular) show that those
governments played a critical role in setting policies that promoted economic
growth through efficient administration and boosted efficiency in domestic
production.7 ° In contrast, the failure of many African countries to develop in 7a
similar fashion is at least partially attributable to failures in government policy. '
As a result, aid scholarship shares a common thread that recipient "country
ownership" is essential for the success of any aid program.72 How country
ownership might look in the aid for trade context is explored infra in the roadmap
section.
C. Distributionand Targeting
Aid is targeted, trade is not. While aid can be used to specifically target a
problem (e.g., prenatal health or building rural roads), the benefits/costs of trade
are much more diffuse. Aid can be structured, at least on paper, in order to deliver
benefits to a specific group (e.g., mothers and infants or rural farmers). Generally,
delivery of such benefits is overseen by the public sector. Trade works quite
differently. Even though the government initially sets trade policy, perhaps in
response to supra-national norms imposed by the WTO, it is ultimately up to the
private sector to respond to the trade policy by changing its behavior. If firms
change their behavior and exports increase, the distribution of any benefits (or
losses) would also be primarily be based on market forces. The public sector may
play a limited role, through taxation for example. In large part, the distribution of
68. See generally MICHAEL TREBILCOCK, MARSHA CHANDLER & ROBERT HOWSE, TRADE AND
TRANSITIONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ADJUSTMENT POLICIES 104 (1999); Harold Bratt, Issues
in Worker Certification and Questions of Future Direction in the Trade Adjustment Assistance
Program, 14 LAW & POL'Y. INT'L. BuS. 819, 823 (1982-1983).
69. See Booth, supra note 58 at 45 (describing the need for the recipient country to play a strong
role in the coordination, prioritization, and sequencing of aid investments as a critical component of
country ownership).
70. Id. at 40-41.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 45.
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trade gains will be determined based on both objective factors (costs of materials,
production, and transport) and bargaining (expressions of power relations among
the relevant actors). To put it another way, governments can exercise more control
over the use of funds from aid than they do over trade. This usually means that
governments are more eager to use aid for targeted policies than trade, which is
more diffuse in its effect. The problem inherent in the distribution versus targeting
conflict is that some governments may be resistant to aid for trade, preferring nontargeted aid that would go directly into its general operating budget instead. The
best way to ensure aid for trade is welcomed by recipient countries is to ensure it
does not diminish the levels of other more general aid.
D. Balanceof Power Issues between Donors and Recipients
Aid creates an inherent power imbalance between donors and aid recipients.
The donor exercises virtually complete discretion over whether or not to give, how
much to give, and, to a lesser but nonetheless significant extent, how aid funds are
to be spent.
Donors, and the multilateral agencies responsible for aid
disbursement, are also largely in charge of assessing the outcomes of aid. The
recipient, on the other hand, may complain (perhaps loudly enough to shame the
donor into action)7 3 if aid is diminished or cut off, but is helpless to do much
beyond that. Certainly, the recipient can not rely on any enforcement mechanisms
to restore or guarantee aid. The international trade regime only exacerbates this
"beggars can't be choosers" problem.
Aid beneficiaries must negotiate with their benefactors at the WTO level for
trade concessions. The result is that many developing nations heavily reliant on
aid, such as many of the poorest least developed countries, must take antagonistic
negotiation positions against their most generous benefactors, such as the U.S.,
U.K., E.U., and Japan, who are also often the most active players in the WTO.
That can be at best awkward and at worst incapacitating.
In some cases, the level of aid can hinder a developing country's development
through trade. This is true for the most economically vulnerable countries like
Malawi, for example, in which aid comprises from 20 percent to 27 percent of
gross national income in the 1990s to 2002 and Uganda, in which aid accounted
for in between 11 percent to 16 percent of gross national income in the same
period. 7 Even more starkly, in both Malawi and Uganda, the inflows of aid have
been equal to or greater than the value of their total exports in goods and services,
so that dependence on aid is just like the dependency of a country on its principal
export. 75 As one scholar has noted:

73. See e.g., C. Cora True-Frost, The Security Council and Norm Consumption, 40 N.Y.U. J. INT'L
L. & POL. 115, 172 (2007) (describing the naming and shaming tactics of the U.N. Security Council
with respect to the recruitment of children in armed conflict); Annette Burkeen, Private Orderingand
Institutional Choice: Defining the Role of Multinational Corporations in Promoting Global Labor
Standards, 6 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REv. 205, 237-38 (2007) (discussing the use of shaming in

urging governments to enforce international labor standards).
74. See Page, supra note 60, at 25.

75. Id. at 24.
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This problem has not been sufficiently recognised by those who advise
countries to develop through trade, and then try to assist them to do so
through aid, partly because it is a new problem... .This was not true of
Asian or Latin American countries when they were major aid recipients,
so that any such effect was much less significant, although countries
such as Bangladesh approached this level of dependency; aid was
greater than its exports in the late 1970s and in some years up to the
early 1990s; it is now 10 per cent. For India, however, the highest level
was under 15 per cent, and it is now below 2 per cent. In contrast, for
Malawi the figure was almost 80 per cent in 1990; for Uganda it was
over 90 per cent; and it remains high in these countries.76
Countries dependent on aid are prima facie weak. They lack political and
economic power, which translates into a weak negotiating position. Countries like
Malawi and Uganda are even worse off because their heavy reliance on aid over
trade renders any bargaining power they might possess over trade issues virtually
meaningless. Ironically, the pragmatic strategy of representative participation and
coalition building that developing countries have engaged in recent years may
disenfranchise aid-dependent nations even more. The strategy, which has been
successful in enabling developing countries to play a more active role in
multilateral negotiations than in the past, involves heavy brokering of national
interests among developing nations before advancing a unified negotiating position
to the larger WTO membership. These representative negotiation positions are
often offered under the auspices of coalitions like the G-20 and the G-90." The
smallest and most vulnerable developing countries in these coalitions are subject to
tremendous pressure to subjugate their national interests to the greater goals of the
coalition. The overlap between those with little political power among the G-90
and those most heavily dependent on foreign aid further dilutes the bargaining
positions of the weakest.
Despite these power asymmetries, it is critical that developing nations seeking
to develop through trade do participate in trade negotiations and learn about the
workings of WTO institutions so that they can leverage what power they do
possess to their advantage. Developed nations committed to the same goal have
pledged large amounts of technical assistance aid in order to make it happen. A
significant part of aid for trade enables developing nations' participation in
negotiations. Some of such aid is indirect, such as conferences, seminars, and
retreats to familiarize officials with WTO rules and institutions, usually organized
at the regional level.
However, some aid is directly aimed at enabling
participation, such as salaries for staff at ministerial conferences, costs of travel,
and the costs of representation or maintenance of a mission in Geneva, the WTO's
headquarters. However, as necessary and laudable as such assistance might be, it
must be difficult for a negotiator, whose office, salary, and travel is paid for by a
76. Id.
77. The G-90 is composed of the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Group, LDCs Group, and
the Africa Group - three overlapping representative groups which are in turn comprised of smaller
associations and regional integration coalitions such as Caricom and the Pacific Island Forum.
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donor/trading partner, to put the forms of support out of her
negotiations. The important point is simply that trade officials and
be mindful of these power asymmetries created by aid in structuring
aid for trade. I will make specific prescriptions in the next section,
for how the WTO can structure technical assistance aid for trade to
effects of the problem on the most vulnerable economies.
V. A ROADMAP
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Aid for trade has tremendous potential. If done right, it can help to bring
developing nations out of poverty, legitimize and democratize the WTO, and
provide the basis for a fertile intellectual exchange between two divergent
disciplines. Such is the potential. But there are also many pitfalls, as this article
has pointed out. This section provides a roadmap to ensure that aid for trade does
live up to its promise. The roadmap is a call to action to four contingencies, the
WTO, developing nations, donors, and the legal community, encompassing both
academia and trade lawyers. Each of the four subsections in this section provides
prescriptions for each of the four contingencies.
A. What the WTO Can Do
1. Bring Doha to a Successful Conclusion
The most important thing the WTO can do is bring the Doha Round to a
successful conclusion. Even though the outlook is grim, the WTO's Director
General and Secretariat must continue to push for the talks to resume and work
tirelessly for the round to end in agreements that meaningfully address the core
concerns of developing countries. As useful as aid for trade might be, it can be no
substitute for a successful Doha Round. The long-term goals of developing
countries can only be addressed at the level of multilateral negotiations, not
through aid for trade. Even though this point has been acknowledged by the WTO,
it is so important that it must be constantly and clearly kept in mind.
2. Assist Developing Countries in Actively Participating in Doha Round and
Subsequent Negotiations
A corollary to the first point is that the WTO must take a lead in giving
developing nations the assistance they need to play an active role in the Doha
Round and subsequent rounds of negotiations. The WTO can take several concrete
steps to do so now. In general, developing countries need help in implementation
of WTO rules, negotiation support and training for meaningful participation in
multilateral rounds, integration into the day to day mechanisms of the WTO's
work, and dispute settlement.78
Three of the proposals considered in this

78. The WTO has implemented a series of online courses available for all interested parties, not
just developing nations. In May 2007, the WTO began its eTraining program, which currently offers
online courses providing a spectrum of information to participants ranging from basic introductory
information regarding the WTO generally to an in-depth understanding of technical aspects of specific
WTO agreements. In addition, the program offers both thematic and special courses addressing the
DSU. Since the program started less than a year ago, thousands of individuals have participated in the
courses. During each course, WTO experts provide participants with tutoring and live chats online. See
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subsection address the first three needs. The last area, dispute settlement support,
is discussed in conjunction with what the legal profession can do. In brief, the
WTO should focus aid for trade resources on (a) improving the effectiveness of
technical assistance to developing nations by making it more demand-driven, (b)
providing all developing nations who are members of the WTO with missions in
Geneva, and (c) enhancing the transparency of the overall trade regime. Each of
the proposals shall be discussed in turn.
a. Demand-Driven Technical Assistance
A core part of aid for trade is for trade-related technical assistance and
capacity building ("TRTA/CB") initiatives to enhance developing countries'
access to the WTO system and their effective participation in trade negotiations.
One of the little-acknowledged accomplishments of the Doha Development
Agenda has been to focus attention and resources on the need for such initiatives.
The Doha Ministerial Declaration of December 2001 explicitly affirmed:
[T]hat technical cooperation and capacity building are core elements of
the development dimension of the multilateral trading system.... The
delivery of WTO technical assistance shall be designed to assist
developing and least-developed countries and low-income countries in
transition to adjust to WTO rules and disciplines, implement obligations
and exercise the rights of membership, including drawing on the
benefits of an open, rules-based multilateral trading system. Priority
shall also be accorded to small, vulnerable, and transition economies, as
well as to members and observers without representation in Geneva. 79
There is widespread agreement that TRTA/CB efforts are a critical part of the
Doha Development Agenda (DDA), and that much hinge on their success. This is
because TRTA/CB measures are a necessary first step towards full participation by
developing nations in the WTO. In other words, TRTA/CB initiatives must work
in order for there to be progress in the negotiations of the Doha Development
Agenda. Therefore, since 2001, donor countries have committed large amounts of
money to TRTA/CB initiatives, and the WTO has spear-headed a number of
TRTA/CB projects. 80 All of these efforts are laudable as first steps. However, the
results overall have been rather disappointing. The consensus, with respect to the
impact of these initiatives, and the DDA in general, seems to be that "we are not
8
where we wanted to be... progress has been slow - much too slow."'
The WTO's first Global Review of Aid for Trade in late 2007 was in part a
response to the frustratingly slow progress of the DDA. As part of the Global
WTO launches online training courses for 2008, available at
http://www.wto.org/English/news-e/news08_e/etraining-feb08 _e.htm (last visited May 8, 2008).
79. World Trade Org., Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, 38, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1
[hereinafter
Doha
Ministerial
Declaration],
available
at
http://www.wto.org/English/thewto-e/ministe/min0 l -e/mindecl-e.htm.
80. See Kathy-Ann Brown, Can Donors Help Countries to Negotiate and Maintain their Rights
Under Trade Agreements?, in TRADE AND AID: PARTNERS OR RIVALS IN DEVELOPMENT POLICY? 245,
246-49 (Sheila Page ed., 2006).
81. Id. at 246.
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Review, donors and agencies, led by the OECD, have embarked on comprehensive
review of their TRTA/CB programs. The results of these reviews have just been
made available by the WTO and the OECD. The time is ripe for some
comprehensive reforms.
One of most striking themes to emerge from the OECD and donor selfassessment reports is that there is no agreement on what constitutes a "successful"
technical assistance or trade-capacity building result. 82 This is so despite the fact
that there does seem to be agreement about what criteria to use to assess
programs. 83 No one seems to be able to tell if the programs are working or not.
Trade experts can learn from aid experts here. As discussed in the previous
section, modem aid is more demand-driven and state-centered than ever before.
Aid experts and scholars understand that aid is more effective when a country (a)
actually requests it for a specific purpose and (b) takes "ownership" of it in terms
of allocation, policy setting, and accountability. It seems to me that these
principles should apply with equal force to trade-related technical and capacitybuilding aid. The implications are straight-forward distribute and prioritize
TRTA-CB aid in accordance with requests from developing countries and give
them autonomy in its usage (including the freedom to pool funds from different
donor sources for an articulated goal), coupled with accountability to donors as
well as domestic constituencies. To the extent attempts to impose TRTA-CB
programs from the top-down has not worked, it may be time to try a bottom-up,
demand-driven approach.
First, the WTO should establish an office, headed by the Aid for Trade
Secretary, whose primary job is to serve as a coordinator between aid beneficiaries,
disbursing agencies, the WTO, other multilateral and regional agencies, and aid
organizations. The Aid for Trade Secretary would become a clearinghouse of
sorts, solely responsible for dissemination of aid for trade preferences to the
relevant donors and organizations. The office of the Aid for Trade Secretary need
not be very large, four or five staff members should suffice, because its main job is
coordinate and maximize the efficiency of the work of the primary aid institutions
by centralizing all aid for trade preferences and methodologies.
Having a centralized office to coordinate all aid for trade projects would be
lead to much greater policy coherence and ultimately more effective projects,
especially in the TRTA/CB arena. It would be a vast improvement over the
current approach, in which "trade-related assistance has frequently been delivered
randomly, indiscriminately, and more often than not, on a stand-alone basis. 84
The WTO is the logical institution to house the Aid for Trade office because of its
expertise on trade capacity building aid and technical assistance to comply with
WTO rules and disciplines. It already provides some direct training on these

82. Id.
83. Most agencies evaluate programs on the basis of five agreed upon criteria relevance,
efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability and/or institutional development.
84. Susan Prowse, Mega-Coherence: The Integrated Framework, in TRADE AND AID: PARTNERS
OR RIVALS IN DEVELOPMENT POLICy? 77, 82 (Sheila Page ed., 2006).
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issues, and can help other deliver such assistance more effectively. Moreover, in
the current climate of uncertainty over the fate of the Doha Round, there is strong
political will among many developed nations to promote measures to assist
developing countries. The political climate has resulted already in increases in aid
giving among developed nations, the U.K. most notably. Donors should be quite
amendable to pledging assistance towards a cause that not only benefits developing
nations now but may also ultimately result in a successful Doha Round.86
Therefore, the WTO should be able to divert some of the aid for trade pledges
towards the defraying the costs of the Aid for Trade office. Should the WTO not
establish the office, perhaps because it does not want to take on the work
traditionally associated with development and aid agencies, then the office should
be housed within the World Bank, UNCTAD, or UNDP. However, the WTO is a
better forum.
Let's look at how such an approach might work. Viet Nam became a member
of the WTO in 2007.87 Soon after joining the WTO, it received over seventy
projects related to its accession from over twenty donors, both bilateral and
multilateral. 88 Most of the projects were offered as stand-alone programs, without
any regard to overlap, duplication, or horizontal integration. Not only is such aid
inefficient, it actually creates coordination and administrative headaches for Viet
Nam. As a result, authorities in Viet Nam have lamented the lack of a more
coordinated approach from its donors. 89 It is possible to deliver aid for trade in a
more integrated manner. Assume that Viet Nam has three main areas in which it
needs assistance - overhauling its investment regulations to comply with TRIMS, 90

85. Mark Landler, Britain Overtakes U.S. as Top World Bank Donor,N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2007,
at World, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/15/world/15worldbank.htm (stating that the
World Bank had raised $25.1 billion in aid for the world's poorest countries, a record sum that includes
donations by China and Egypt, nations that were once recipients of such aid and that for the first time,
the U.K. overtook the U.S. as the biggest donor with its pledge of $4.2 billion).
86. A successful Doha Round would also yield significant advantages for developed nations.
Altruism need not be the only motivation for bringing Doha to a successful close. For example, just on
the question of market access for agricultural products, developed nations have a lot to gain from
improved access to export markets in developing nations, especially for meat products, which are in
greater demand as a country becomes more affluent. See comments of Representative Cal Dooley, in
Occasional Papers, Dean Rusk Center, University of Georgia School of Law, No. 4 Agriculture and the
WTO: Subsidies in the Cross Hairs at 38 (2005) ( "As incomes rise in the developing world, a
significant portion of the increase will be spent on improved diets, which invariably means increased
meat consumption.").
87. The General Council approved Viet Nam's accession package on November 7, 2006. Viet
Nam became the WTO's 150th member on January 11, 2007. All legal documents, including
commitments on tariffs, services, investment, pertaining to Viet Nam's membership are available at the
World Trade Organization's site.
World Trade Organization, Accession Status: Viet Nam,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/acc e/al VietName.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2008).
88. Prowse, supra note 84, at 82.
89. Id.
90. The Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures ("TRIMs"), negotiated during the
Uruguay Round, applies only to measures that affect trade in goods. Recognizing that certain
investment measures can have trade-restrictive and distorting effects, it states that no member shall
apply a measure that is prohibited by the provisions of GATT Article III (national treatment) or Article
XI (quantitative restrictions). Examples of inconsistent measures, as spelled out in the Annex's
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implementing the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement 91 (SPS Agreement)
domestically, and maximizing exports in its burgeoning clothing and textile
industries. Assume that Viet Nam has a number of other accession related issues
that are of lesser urgency. Under my proposal, Viet Nam would be able to make
its priorities known to the relevant donors, simply by apprising the Aid for Trade
Secretary in the WTO, who would in turn make the information available through
the Integrated Framework to donors, other multilateral agencies, NGO's and other
interested parties. Viet Nam would then able to examine all the incoming project
proposals to ascertain fit with its three priorities. It would then work with the
office of the Aid for Trade Secretary to pool the various projects, combining donor
resources where possible, putting off or slow-tracking projects of secondary
importance, and coordinate reporting/accountability mechanisms within the
various projects.
b. Improve Developing Countries' Presence and Participation
The WTO is a completely state-centered system. As such, one might expect
that all 151 of its members maintain a presence at its headquarters in Geneva, so
that members might be able to monitor the day to day developments in the WTO
and advance their national interests in negotiations. Unfortunately, that is not the
93
92
case. Twenty WTO members (and ten observers) have no mission in Geneva.
Illustrative List, include local content or trade balancing requirements. The agreement contains
transitional arrangements allowing members to maintain notified TRIMs for a limited time following
the entry into force of the WTO (two years in the case of developed country members, five years for
developing country members, and seven years for least-developed country members). The agreement
also establishes a Committee on TRIMs to monitor the operation and implementation of these
commitments.
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Legal Instruments - Results of the Uruguay
Round, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal_e/I 8-trimse.htm.
91. The SPS Agreement deals with food safety and animal and plant health standards and includes
provisions on control, inspection and approval procedures. Governments must provide advance notice
of new or changed sanitary and phytosanitary regulations, and establish a national enquiry point to
provide information. The agreement complements the agreements on technical barriers to trade.
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Legal Instruments - Results of the Uruguay
Round, availableat http://www.wto.org/english/docs e/legal e/15 sps_01 _e.htm.
92. The Observers are Bahamas, Equatorial Guinea, Montenegro, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe,
Seychelles, Tajikistan, Tonga, and Vanuatu. See World Trade Org., WTO Organizes "Geneva Weeks"
for Non-Resident Delegations, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/devel-e/genwk-e.htm (last visited
Feb. 6, 2008) (providing a list of participating WTO members and observers).
93. See id. African countries without permanent representation to the WTO are Central African
Republic, Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Guyana, Equatorial Guinea, Lao Malawi, Maldives, Niger, Sierra
Leone, and Togo. The Pacific WTO members without missions are Fiji, Papua New Guinea and
Solomon Islands. The Caribbean Nations without representation are Antigua & Barbuda, Belize, the
Commonwealth of Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, and St. Vincent and the
Grenadines. Even those developing nations that do have permanent representation in Geneva suffer
human resources constraints that make it hard for them to attend even the most critical meetings and
negotiations. The extended negotiation process in the WTO is so demanding that it seriously overextends the capacity of many developing nations. Even though the problem is somewhat endemic to
all developing nations, one of the goals of the TRTA/CB measures discussed above in subsection 2A is
to improve the quality of their involvement in WTO processes, which is at least useful in optimizing the
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This means that a staggering 16 percent of the WTO membership lacks the ability
to participate in the WTO at the most basic level. In addition, many LDCS and
smaller countries maintain missions in Geneva with fewer than five professional
staff, who are heavily over-burdened with tracking not only issues related to the
94
WTO, but also the activities of all international organizations located in Geneva.
Of course, these countries are still better off than those without permanent
representation, who can't perform their WTO functions at all.
The WTO must improve its efforts to integrate the non-resident members of
the WTO. To be sure, all the non-resident members are developing or vulnerable
countries with small economies, and are never going to be major players in the
WTO system like Brazil, China, or India, whose sizes and economies dwarf the
non-resident members. Nonetheless, these countries should not be left out for a
number of reasons. First, even though their economies are small, in the aggregate
they are not insignificant. In terms of population affected, they represent large
numbers of the poorest in the world. As such, these countries have the most to
gain from development and therefore have an important stake in making the WTO
system responsive to their needs. Third, and most importantly, the fact that 16
percent of the membership is excluded from the day to day business of the WTO is
a sad indictment of a system that claims to be open, transparent, and democratic.
The WTO has recognized the importance of enhancing the participation of
non-residents. Prior to the Seattle Ministerial Conference in 1999, it launched an
effort, together with twelve other international organizations, to involve
representatives from non-resident members by assisting them with preparing for
the Seattle Conference and apprising them of technical assistance available to them
from the WTO and other agencies. Subsequent
to 1999, the practice became
' 95
institutionalized and is known as "Geneva Week. ,
Geneva Week currently occurs twice a year. It brings together permanent
WTO officers and senior officials from the twenty WTO members and ten
Observers without representation as well as representatives from specialized
organizations who work with them. 9 6 Participants in the program learn about
recent developments in the WTO. Through seminars, they receive detailed
briefings on the progress of the Doha Round agenda items, known as the Doha
Work Program. They also receive reports on development issues in general, such
as the work of the WTO Sub-Committee on Least Developed Countries on special
human resources developing nations do possess. With respect to the countries without missions in
Geneva, such TRTA/CB measures can be of no help at all. They need help of a different character.
94. See Brown, supra note 80, at 264.
95. Funding for the program was permanently secured by the General Council in 2002, pursuant
to the Ministerial Declaration. The General Council approved the funding from the regular budget for
Geneva Week. See World Trade Org., supra note 79, 40, 43; see also Committee on Trade and
Development, Note by the Secretariat: Annual Report on Training and Technical Cooperation (1
January to 31 December 2004), WT/COMTD/W/139 (Apr. 19, 2005), available at
http://www.wtocenter.org.tw/SmartKMS/fileviewer?id=64342.
96. See World Trade Org., supra note 92 ("The Geneva Week events benefit from regular
contributions in the form of seminars organized by the Agency for International Trade Information and
Cooperation (AITIC) and occasionally from the Commonwealth Secretariat.").
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challenges facing small economies. In addition, participants attend some regularly
scheduled meetings of the WTO.
97
Participants seem to find the programs offered during Geneva Week helpful,
but most believe more needs to be done. Once again, this is an area in which
responding directly to the requests of developing countries is necessary. Some
participants have asked that the WTO organize more than two Geneva Weeks per
year. 98 They believe it would be helpful to organize regional briefing sessions in
addition to the Geneva-based programs. 99 One commentator has observed that:
An objective assessment would seem to suggest that Geneva Week
heightens the awareness of Non-Residents of the fact that they are on
the sidelines of a process that will have consequences for them, but it is
a full
questionable whether it has been successful in providing
00
appreciation of the importance of effective participation. 1
I don't think there is any reason to believe that WTO members without
representation in Geneva do not appreciate the importance of effective
participation. Developing nations are generally quite savvy about the importance
of the Geneva process and acutely aware of their stake in the world trading
Rather, the limited success of the Geneva Week experience is more
regime.''
likely reflective of the fact that two yearly sessions are far from adequate. One of
the highest priorities of the WTO's aid for trade agenda must be the establishment
of permanent missions for members without representation. In order to minimize
costs, each of the twenty non-resident nations need not necessarily have their own
missions. As the non-residents can be grouped into African, Caribbean, and
Pacific Islands, even three permanent representative missions would be highly
beneficial.
There is already is successful model for such a representative mission. In
2001, the European Union funded a non-resident facility operated by the Pacific
Islands Forum, 0 2 which provides representation to fourteen Pacific Countries. 103
The Pacific Island Forum facility has had a positive impact, giving voice to a
group of nations seldom heard at WTO proceedings. In 2005, the Forum
appointed a joint Ambassador to represent its members in the WTO. 1°4 The
representative mission model can be replicated with success for the African and
Caribbean groups as well, although it is likely that the African representative
mission may need to be split into two in order to reflect the divergent goals

97. Brown, supranote 80, at 267.
98. See id.
99. Id.

100. Id.
101. See e.g., Inaamul Haque, Doha Development Agenda: Recapturing the Momentum of
Multilateralismand Developing Countries, 17 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1097, 1110(2002).
102. Brown, supra note 80, at 268.
103. Id. (listing the fourteen countries as Fiji, Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands, Samoa,
Tonga and Vanuatu, Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru,
Niue, Palau, and Tuvalu).
104. Id.
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relevant to that more diverse group. In conclusion, aid for trade cannot be said to
have gotten off the ground if it does not address the appalling problem of members
without representation. Only when these small and vulnerable economies have
representation in Geneva can they begin to participate in the process and play a
role in defining new rules to adequately address their interests.
c. Enhance Transparency and Democracy in the Multilateral Trading System
The WTO has been progressively moving towards greater openness and
transparency in its operations. Until recently multilateral negotiations and dispute
settlement proceedings were not open to the public. For example, even the
practice of accepting amicus curiae briefs has been hotly contested and
controversial. 10 5 However, the tide seems to be turning. Two pivotal events
signaled the sea-change. First, the WTO invited NGOs to attend its Ministerial
Conferences beginning in 1996 at the Singapore conference, when 108 NGOs
attended. 106 Prior to this, only member state representatives were invited to the
By the December 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial
Ministerial Conferences.
Conference, over 800 NGOs attended.'° 7 Opening up the ministerial proceedings
to NGOs as observers marks quite a stride in the direction of greater transparency.
It also enables NGOs to have access to WTO negotiations in real time so that they
are able to respond, comment on and possibly affect policy outcomes.lO0 Second,
on January 8, 2008, at the request of the U.S. and the European Communities, the
two parties in the dispute, arguments in front of the dispute settlement panel 109 will
105. See generally Cai supra note 29, at 475-489 (discussing the progress the WTO had made
towards greater transparency).
106. See
World Trade
Org., List of NGO's Who Attended in Singapore,
http://www.wto.org/english/forums -e/ngoe/ngosin e.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2008).
107. Steve Charnovitz, Nongovernmental Organizationsand InternationalLaw, 100 AM. J. INT'L L.
348, 372 (2006) (discussing NGO attendance in footnote 148).
108. As part of Pascal Lamy's recent initiatives on greater transparency and an enhanced dialogue
with NGOs, the list of NGO Position Papers received by the Secretariat is circulated for the information
of members and members and the public may view all the position papers submitted. See
World Trade Org., http://www.wto.org/english/forumse/ngo-e/pospap-e.htm (last visited Feb. 19,
2008) (providing a complete list of position papers related to WTO issues submitted by NGOs to the
WTO Secretariat). See e.g., Chamovitz, supra note 107, at 369 (arguing that NGOs exert relatively
weak influence on the WTO although that may be changing with respect to high-profile trade issues,
such as maintaining access to pharmaceuticals and reducing trade-distorting agricultural subsidies);
Steve Chamovitz, WTO Cosmopolitics, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 299, 353 (2002) (arguing that the
WTO needs the input and support of NGOs and citizens groups); Joost Pauwelyn, The Transformation
of World Trade, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1, 58-59 (2005) (arguing that non-state actors can and do influence
the WTO political process even without a formal say or vote in WTO decision-making process); On the
other hand, some commentators argue that NGOs must push for more formal ways to provide input to
the WTO, see e.g., Daniel C. Esty, Non-Governmental Organizationsat the World Trade Organization:
Cooperation, Competition, or Exclusion, 1 J. INT'L ECON. L. 123, 131 (1998); Gabrielle Marceau &
Peter N. Pedersen, Is the WTO Open and Transparent?,33 J. WORLD TRADE 5, 44-45 (1999).
109. For the first decade of GATT, dispute settlement relied primarily on diplomatic means to stop
violations of the substantive agreements. In the 1950s, it became the practice to use panels for dispute
settlements. At the end of a dispute settlement a GATT panel would issue a report, which had to be
adopted by a positive consensus among all GATT members. Effectively, this meant the losing party
could always block adoption of a panel report by voting against it. During the Tokyo Round of trade
negotiations (1973-1979), the GATT established codes of conduct for panels, discussed non-tariff
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be open to the public. " 0 The case is "United States - Continued Existence and
Application of Zeroing Methodology" (DS350). The panel will start its meeting
with the parties on January 29, 2008 with a session open to public viewing at the
WTO headquarters in Geneva. Public viewing will take place via a real time
closed-circuit television broadcast.
A second public session may follow,
depending on the discretion of the panel. The parties will make their oral
arguments during these public sessions.
These efforts at enhancing greater openness and transparency in the WTO
need to be encouraged. As another step towards addressing the democratic deficit
problem, the WTO must take full advantage of the opportunities aid for trade
offers for reaching out to both the U.N. and civil society actors. The WTO should
cooperate more closely with the World Bank, the IMF, the U.N. General
Assembly, and NGOs. Please see infra subsection III.A for a fuller description of
each of the concrete proposals, particularly with regards to the U.N. and NGOs.
B. What DevelopingNations can Do
Aid for trade can provide an invaluable training ground for the type of role
developing nations ought to play. There are several ways developing nations can
leverage the opportunities opened by aid for trade to advance their agenda. First,
barriers, and accorded preferential treatment for developing countries. JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL
PROBLEMS

OF

INTERNATIONAL

ECONOMIC

RELATIONS CASES,

MATERIALS AND

TEXT

ON THE

NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 200, 257

(4th ed. 2002). The next round of trade talks, the so-called Uruguay Round (1986-1994), aimed at the
further development of trade law, led to the idea of creating an umbrella WTO. The round saw the need
for a more adjudicative process for dispute settlement, a reformation of trade in textiles and agriculture,
and an expansion of the trade agreements to include intellectual property and trade in services. On April
15, 1994, 123 participating countries signed the agreement for the formation of the WTO. Under the
WTO, the GATT still serves as the WTO's umbrella treaty for trade in goods. See generally World
Trade
Organization,
The
Uruguay
Round,
http://www.wto.org/English/thewto-e/whatis-e/tif e/fact5_e.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2008). Under the
new WTO system, legitimization of panels' decisions no longer depended on the whim of a single
nation that could block adoption of the panel report. Rather, decisions are effectively valid upon
issuance and take on the force of law unless all member-nations affirmatively act to reject adoption,
which is unlikely, and at any rate, difficult. Such reverse consensus eliminates many of the delays in
adoption and subsequent non-compliance that plagued the old dispute resolution process. Panel reports
are also subject to review by an Appellate Body with power to overturn the legal findings and
conclusions of law made by panels. Commentators who have given a generally positive assessment of
the WTO dispute settlement system include: William J. Davey, WTO Dispute Settlement System: The
First Ten Years, 8 J. INTL'L ECON. L. 17 (2005); Thomas A. Zimmerman, WTO Dispute Settlement at
Ten: Evolution, Experiences, and Evaluation, 60 AUSSENWIRTSCHAFT - THE SWISS REVIEW OF INT'L
ECON. REL. 27 (2005); John H. Jackson, The Changing Fundamentals of International Law and Ten
Years of the WTO, 8 J. INT'L ECON. L. 3 (2005). For an economic assessment that presents mixed
findings, see Monika BiOtler, The WTO Dispute Settlement System: A First Assessment from an
Economic Perspective, 16 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 503 (2000). Other commentators who give a mixed to
negative review of the first decade of the DSU include: Daniel K. Tarullo, The Hidden Costs of
InternationalDispute Settlement: WTO Review of Domestic Anti-Dumping Decisions, 34 LAW & POL'Y
INT'L Bus. 109 (2002) and John Ragosta, Navin Joneja, & Mikhail Zeldovich, WTO Dispute
Settlement: The System is Flawed and Must be Fixed, 37 INT'L L. 697 (2003).
110. See World Trade Org., WTO Hearings on Zeroing Dispute opened to the Public, Jan. 8, 2008,
http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/news08_e/dispute350_e.htm.
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they need to see aid for trade as a chance to gather the empirical evidence that
would convince developed countries of the need for policy changes. No one, no
matter how pre-disposed or sympathetic, will change their positions on important
issues without compelling evidence. Of course, developing nations have been
quite sophisticated in presenting and arguing their cases at Ministerial
Conferences. However, those tactics have not worked to date.
Right now, developing nations have two choices. They can opt out of the
Doha Round, perhaps placing the blame for the stalling of the Doha Round on
developed nations captive to powerful protectionist lobbies, which is at least
partially correct. Or, they can choose to focus instead on strategies for success in
the next phase of the negotiations. To do so, they must take the monitoring efforts
of the Task Force on Aid for Trade seriously, by submitting frank and detailed
recipient country assessments. They must also act proactively, by coordinating
among themselves to scrutinize all aid for trade projects for patterns and broad
themes, which can then become the rallying points for policy change. Each aid for
trade project reveals a weakness in the current trading system. Together, the
wisdom amassed from all projects can play a major role in reforming the system to
make it work better for developing nations.
Organizations like the Cairns Group,"'l an alliance of agricultural producers
from both developed and developing countries, should take a lead in the type of
information gathering, analysis, and policy setting described above. They may be
better positioned to accomplish these tasks than the OECD, the World Bank or the
WTO (all of whom already play a role) for several reasons. First, requests from
the Cairns Group will not be perceived as top-down orders from powerful elites, as
a request from the OECD or the World Bank might. Second, aid recipient
countries may provide better and more detailed information to the Cairns Group
because the group is seen not only an ally of developing nations, but more
importantly, as an entity that is not coercive or evaluative. For example, in
situations where aid for trade projects failed, aborted, abandoned, curtailed, or
unfinished, a country may refrain from submitting a self-assessment report
altogether or submit only a partial one fearing that lack of positive results to report
to the World Bank may lead to a decrease in aid funds. Countries may also
withhold or distort negative data for fear that it may lead to a net decrease in aid
dollars donors will give. Such fears, reasonable in the context of giving feedback
to the World Bank, are greatly diminished when the Cairns Group or a similar
organization is the intended recipient. Other benefits can accrue as well. The
I 11. The Cairns Group, which now has 18 members, is a powerful alliance of some of the world's
largest agricultural producers that has played a very active role in pushing for greater liberalization in
agricultural products. The Cairns Group itself operates through ministers and officials at a government
to government level. Farmer organizations in the individual countries are closely consulted by their
governments to frame Cairns Group policies and positions. The great majority of Cairns Group
members are developing nations. Current members are Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada,
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Paraguay, The
Philippines, South Africa, Thailand and Uruguay. See Cairns Group Farm Leaders, What is the Cairns
Group of Farm Leaders?, http://www.cairnsgroupfanners.org/cairnsgrp'html (last visited Feb. 19,
2008).
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Cairns Group may be able to amalgamate country assessments so as to identify
systemic failures (such as lack of administrative support for new institutions put in
place through aid for trade) in ways that an individual country can not. Thus, I
envision a two-tiered process whereby country assessments are performed by aidrecipients, but then given to the Cairns or a similar representative for secondary
processing, resulting in the issuance of a supplementary report by such
organization focusing on regional trends and containing policy proposals. The
results of the supplementary report and the individual assessments would be made
available to the applicable multilateral organization.
However, the results of such due diligence and policy setting must also make
their way to the membership of the WTO at large. Fortunately, developing nations
have already proven themselves quite adept at this aspect of the multilateral trade
process, through the G-20, a coalition of leading developing nations that has very
proactive during WTO negotiations in recent years. 112 There is no doubt that the
G-20 will continue to play an important role in future negotiations. The G-20 is
ideally situated to translate the facts and recommendations gathered through aid for
trade analysis into policy positions at multilateral negotiations. Aid for trade
provides a similar opportunity for the G-20 to play a leadership role in information
gather, policy setting, and advocacy.
C. What the Trade Legal Community can Do
1. Joint Research with Aid Experts
The legal community must also play a role in making aid for trade a success.
Critically, trade academics, practitioners, and other experts must engage in a
greater dialogue with their aid counterparts. The two fields have thus far
developed completely independently of each other, often with a sense of
"ignorance and mistrust," 1 13 but that needs to change. As I demonstrated in
subsection III.C above, trade experts have much to learn from the experience and
accumulated knowledge of aid experts. No doubt the inverse is also true, although
that is a topic beyond the reach of this article. Aid for trade is an obvious starting
point for joint research between trade and aid specialists. The field is very undertheorized and researched. In the current literature, there has been only one article
that gives serious treatment to WTO technical assistance and capacity building
programs, and the article was written before the WTO announced its aid for trade
initiative. 114 On the aid side, there is one laudable monograph, which I relied upon
extensively, that discusses aid for trade in great depth," 5 but almost exclusively
from a non-legal perspective. If this article accomplishes nothing beyond inspiring

112. See Sungjoon Cho, Doha's Development, 25 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 165, 170-72 (2007)
(describing the strong role played by the G-20 on agricultural negotiations at the Cancun Ministerial
Conference).
113. Page, supranote 60, at 31.
114. Gregory Shaffer, Can WTO Technical Assistance and Capacity-Building Serve Developing
Countries? 23 WIS. INT'L L. J. 643 (2005).
115. See generally Page, supra note 60. See also Dominic Coppens, Trade and Aid: Partners or
Rivals in Development Policy?, 10 J. INT'L ECON. L. 413 (2007) (providing a review of Page's book).
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one trade expert to undertake empirical or theoretical joint project on aid for trade
with an aid specialist, it would have served its purpose.
2. Expand Private Sector Pro Bono Legal Assistance
One area in which developing nations need aid for trade assistance is
accessing the dispute settlement system of the WTO. For a variety of reasons,
many developing countries do not make use of the dispute settlement mechanism
at all or do so infrequently.1 16 There are a variety of explanations, from lack of
experience, lack of familiarity with the system, lack of human resources to pursue
lengthy litigation, a sense that the system does not provide meaningful remedies to
developing nations with small economies, etc. However, there is no doubt that
developing nations face a serious lack of financial resources and legal expertise
that may inhibit their ability to make full use of the dispute settlement system.
Trade law is a highly specialized field of practice. The number of competent
law firms with a well-established trade law practice is limited. 117 Most of these
firms charge high private sector hourly rates, rates which are largely driven by the8
dominant consumers of their services such as the U.S., E.U., Canada, and Japan"

116. See e.g., Douglas lerley, Defining the Factorsthat Influence Developing Country Compliance
with and Participation in the WTO Dispute Settlement System: Another Look at the Dispute over
Bananas, 33 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 615, 616 (2002) (presenting the five principal factors cited by
diplomats as influencing developing country participation in and compliance with WTO panel and
Appellate Body decisions as: (1) the dramatic influence of the political and economic strength of
developed countries on the dispute settlement process; (2) the effectiveness, at least in principle, of the
dispute settlement system in resolving disputes between countries of diverging political and economic
power; (3) the non-compliance of developed countries with WTO decisions; (4) the lack of recourse to
retaliation; and (5) the lack of financial resources and technical capacity available to developing
countries in order to file and defend against complaints). Conventional wisdom holds that it is a waste
of time for developing nations to pursue complaints against industrial nations because the remedies
available to them are inadequate. Commentators who have weighed in on this question include Robert
E. Hudec, The Adequacy of WTO Dispute Settlement Remedies for Developing Country Complainants,
in DEVELOPMENT, TRADE AND THE WTO: A HANDBOOK 81, 81 (Bernard Hoekman et al. eds., 2002).
While Hudec concedes that this conventional wisdom has "a great deal of truth to it," his paper is
devoted to showing the complexity of the issues involved. Id. See also Marc L. Busch & Eric Reinhardt,
Developing Countries and GeneralAgreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade OrganizationDispute
Settlement, 37 J. WORLD TRADE 719 (2003) (arguing that developing countries are no better served
under the WTO than they were under GATT); Gregory Shaffer, How to Make the WTO Dispute
Settlement System Work for Developing Countries: Some Proactive Developing Country Strategies,
International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, Resource Paper No. 5, Mar. 2003,
availableat http://www.ictsd.org/pubs/ictsdseries/resourcepapers/DSU_2003.pdf.
117. Agency for International Trade Information and Cooperation Documents, Reports on
Meetings, Improving Developing Country Access to the Dispute Settlement Mechanism of the WTO
(Feb.
25,
2000)
[hereinafter
AITIC
Documents],
available
at
http://www.acici.org/aitic/documents/reports/reports5-eng.html
(stating that lawyers and consultants
specializing in WTO dispute settlement cases are found in three main locations: Geneva, Washington
and Brussels).
118. The countries that make the most frequent use of the WTO's dispute settlement system as
complainants during the period of January 1, 1995 to September 30, 2004 are the United States,
Canada, Mexico, European Union, Japan, Korea, India, Thailand, Brazil, Argentina and Chile. See
WTO Secretariat, Statistical Information on Recourse to WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures,
Background Note Preparedfor the Special Session of the Dispute Settlement Body, JOB(03)/225/Rev. I
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and are therefore out of reach for many developing nations. 119 American lawyers
have an ethical obligation to the profession to give pro bono legal assistance. 120 A
similar obligation is imposed on lawyers in other countries as well. 121 While pro
bono work is usually conceived in terms of assistance to low-income individuals or
non-profit organizations, it behooves trade lawyers to think beyond these narrow
conceptions to include needy countries as well. In fact, it is smart for law firms
and individual practitioners to seek out the opportunity to advise or represent
developing countries in WTO dispute settlement proceedings. 122 With some rare
exceptions,123 most WTO dispute settlement proceeding are generally closed to the
(Oct. 22, 04). The list of the most frequent respondents in WTO cases is identical except for the
exclusion of Thailand.
119. See AITIC Documents, supra note 117. According to the AITIC Documents, hourly rates for
trade lawyers range from $200 to $450 per hour, depending on the seniority and experience of the staff
member. In addition all incidental costs (e.g. telephone calls, postage), travel costs (business class) and
hotels are billable.
120. The first quantified goal articulated by the American Bar Association (ABA) was included in
the 1993 version of the Model Rules, when the ABA encouraged attorneys to "aspire to render at least
fifty hours of pro bono public legal services per year." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 6.1
(1993). Finally, in 2002, the ABA revised Model Rule 6.1 to its current version, including a sentence
that focuses on the idea that lawyers have a "professional responsibility to provide legal services to
those unable to pay." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 6.1 (2003). In addition, nearly every state
bar has a statement in its ethics rules emphasizing the need for pro bono service. Forty-seven states
have adopted Model Rule 6.1 in its original form, 1993 revised form, the 2002 revised form, or a
similar form. See American Bar Association, State-by-State Pro Bono Service Rules,
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/probono/stateethicsrules.html#appendix-b (last updated April 26,
2007).
121. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, PRO BONO IN PRINCIPLE AND IN PRACTICE: PUBLIC SERVICE AND

THE PROFESSIONS, 100-24 (2005) (providing an excellent comparative review of the pro bono
requirements and recommendations in other countries).
122. A number of law firms and individuals have registered their availability with the Advisory
Centre on WTO Law (ACWL) to provide their services to least developing nations and other ACWL
members where the ACWL cannot provide representation due to a conflict of interest. The ACWL was
founded in 2001 with the goal of enhancing the participation of developing nations in the WTO. An
independent agency from the WTO, the ACWL provides free advice on WTO law to its developing
country members and to all Least Developed Nations (LDCs) that are Members of the WTO or are in
the process of accession. It defends these countries' interests in WTO dispute settlement proceedings at
very modest fees and offers their officials free training in WTO law through courses, seminars and
internships. Since its establishment in July 2001, the ACWL has prepared over 300 legal opinions,
provided support in 25 WTO dispute settlement proceedings (or about 20% of all such proceedings
initiated in the WTO during that time) and has conducted six-month courses on WTO law every year
since 2002. The ACWL has become an organization that pools the collective experience of its
developing country Members and LDCs in WTO legal matters and makes it available to each of these
countries. The ACWL has 37 members: 10 developed country members, and 27 members entitled to the
services of the ACWL. Two countries, Costa Rica and Georgia, are currently in the process of acceding
to the Agreement Establishing the ACWL. The 42 countries that are classified as LDCs and are
members of the WTO or in the process of acceding to the WTO that have been designated by the United
Nations as LDCs are entitled to the services of the ACWL without becoming ACWL Members.
Advisory Centre on WTO Law, Introduction, http://www.acwl.ch/e/about/about-e.aspx (last visited
Feb. 25, 2008).
123. See World Trade Org., WTO Hearings on Zeroing Dispute opened to the Public, supra note
110 and accompanying text (describing the opening of WTO dispute settlement proceedings to the
public via closed-circuit cameras).
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public. Representing developing nations, even as interested third parties and not
the primary litigants, affords private law firms and lawyers a valuable opportunity
to gain access to and valuable litigation experience in WTO proceedings.
Relationships with developing countries are worth establishing because, if things
go well, their economies will grow and they may resort more frequently to the
dispute settlement system. Moreover, as developing nations continue to coalesce
their interests in the ways described in this article, the result should be greater
cooperation and pooling of litigation efforts as well, a trend which has already
begun with Brazil in the United States - Upland Cotton case. 124 Private law firms
and lawyers would gain much in the long term by cultivating relationships with
developing nations now. Providing pro bono assistance is a form of privately
driven aid for trade that merits closer attention by the profession.
D. What Donors can Do
What donors should do in order to make aid for trade a success fall into two
broad categories. The first, the most obvious, is to continue to contribute aid
funds. When the WTO reports that it has secured funds for its Aid for Trade
initiative from various donors, it is often unclear if those funds are actually
additional to existing Official Development Assistance ("ODA") pledges or
merely an allocation of a portion of ODA pledges to aid for trade projects. 125 In
order for live up to its full promise, as illustrated in Part III of this article, donors
must continue to be generous and give aid for trade funds on top of its existing
general aid pledges. 126 Donors must also take into account the effects of Dutch

124. See generally Appellate Body Report, United States Subsidies on Upland Cotton,
WT/DS267/AB/R
(Mar.
3,
2005),
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu..e/267abr-e.pdf (discussing Brazil's victorious case against
the United States cotton subsidies, and how it was joined by many other nations as interested parties,
many of them developing nations. Brazil was joined by Argentina, Australia, Benin, Canada, Chad,
China, European Communities, India, New Zealand, Pakistan, Paraguay, Taiwan and Venezuela).
125. For instance, on January 11, 2008, Finland announced a donation of CHF 620,000 (EUR
375,000) to the Doha Development Agenda Global Trust Fund (DDAGTF). Since 2000, Finland's
contributions have reached CHF 4.9 million. The press release described the donation as focused on
technical assistance: "This donation will finance technical assistance programmes and training
activities for least developed countries. The aim is to better adapt their practices and laws to WTO rules
and disciplines, improve the implementation of their obligations and enhance the exercise of their
membership rights." As Finland has traditionally been a strong donor in all areas of development
assistance both within and without the WTO, it is not clear from the press release if this donation was
on top of its existing pledges. For example, it is not clear if the pledge to the DDAGTF resulted from a
reallocation from other aid projects, such as poverty-reduction programs. World Trade Org., Finland
Offers CHF 620,000 to the WTO Training Programmefor the Benefit of Developing Countries,Jan. 11,
2008, http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/pres08_e/pr504_e.htm.
126. Sometimes it is quite clear that a nation's aid for trade donation is in fact on top of existing
pledges. One of the more heartening trends in the recent WTO aid for trade initiative is that it is
bringing in a new generation of donors, many of them developing nations. For example, on January 14,
2008, Romania donated EUR 100,000 to the Doha Development Agenda Global Trust Fund
("DDAGTF"), the first contribution of Romania to the DDAGTF. World Trade Org., Romania Offers
EUR
100,000
to
the
WTO
Training
Programme,
Jan.14,
2008,
http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/pres08 e/pr505_e.htm.
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Disease 127 in creating monitoring and assessment structures. Therefore, where
possible, donors should spread-put aid for trade in the medium to long term in
order to offset the effects of Dutch Disease.
The second category of donor contributions is a corollary to the country
ownership points made above in subsections IV.A (with respect to the WTO) and
IV.B (with respect to developing nations). Donors must also acknowledge the
conventional wisdom in the aid literature that aid is most effective when it is
country-driven. Doing so has a number of clear implications for how donors
should structure their aid for trade giving. First, recipient nations should have a
central role in the aid for trade decision process, a country-driven process that
welcomes the participation of civil society organizations and local businesses in
determining priorities. This means that aid for trade programs must be structured
from the premise of local ownership, knowledge, and participation so that trade
strategies are rooted in locally-designed programs and reflective of local
development priorities. The logical corollary of a country-driven aid for trade
regime is that donors must be willing at times to place their interests second. For
example, this might mean allowing a developing country to focus on accessing the
dispute settlement system (perhaps not a primary goal of the donor) rather than the
full implementation of WTO investment rules (which might be of great interest to
the donor). In order for aid for trade to be truly country-driven, the structures for
diagnostic, delivery, and monitoring should ensure that developing nations are free
to use aid for trade funds to enhance the capabilities most critical to them.
Accountability should also begin at the national level. This means that public
oversight of national plans and priorities should be assured through the submission
of such plans to the national parliament or congress for final approval.
Country-driven aid for trade has some other negative implications for donor
behavior as well. First, donors should not attach damaging conditions to the
receipt of aid for trade. This may mean not forcing recipient nations to give up
other social policy goals in favor of trade-capacity building, as discussed above.
But it also extends to forbearing from the imposition of economic policy changes
(such as currency devaluation or reducing deficient spending) that would be
harmful to those living in poverty. Second, aid for trade should be untied from any
requirement that the recipient country purchase donor country products or services,
including consultation services in assessment or monitoring. Third, aid for trade
must be given as aid, and not in the guise of complex financial arrangements that
may result in greater debt for developing countries. Trade-oriented projects are
often expected to "pay for itself' through the generation of export revenues. As
such, there is a temptation to structure them as a mixture of aid and loans. This
can lead to unwarranted increases in debt burdens for developing countries that are
already crippled by their debt burdens. It is particularly important to avoid
imposing more debt service payments on the most vulnerable economies in
Africa.' 2 8 Fourth, aid for trade should be de-coupled from trade negotiation results

127. See supranotes 63-68 and accompanying text.
128. See generally Nsongurua J. Udombana, The Summer has Ended and We are not Saved!
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and not given as a quid pro quo in Doha or future negotiations. Developing
nations are already disadvantaged enough in terms of negotiation positions, and at
any rate, they are already acutely aware of the dual roles donors/negotiators play,
that an explicit linkage between aid and negotiation results is both unnecessary and
heavy-handed. Lastly, monitoring and assessment of aid for trade projects should
not be conducted by donor countries or donor-driven bodies, but rather by
independent civil society or governmental entities.
Donors should also allow developing nations to have some say in determining
how much of a share aid for trade should account for as a share of the total aid it
would receive. This is particularly critical if aid for trade giving is not on top of
existing Official Development Assistance pledges. In such cases, the recipient
nation must be allowed to choose to sacrifice funding for other programs (such as
poverty-reduction, employment generation, or health care) in order to privilege aid
for trade programs. Donors should never make such decisions for them.
This means that the WTO's current system of bundling donations into its
general Doha Development Agenda Global Trust Fund ("DDAGTF")12 9 may not
be optimally responsive to the needs of developing nations. The DDAGTF has
two foci: (1) technical assistance to build capacity for developing countries to
participate in the multilateral trading system, advance their interests, conclude
agreements and implement them and (2) financial and technical assistance to help
developing countries participate in the current round of Doha negotiations. Within
these two broad areas, it does not differentiate among the different priorities
important to developing countries (such as negotiation versus implementation
versus dispute settlement). Moreover, it is a completely top-down system that
incorporates no mechanisms for recipient country input or direction. Also, there is
little transparency about the impact of DDAGTF giving on overall development
assistance.
Donors would be well-advised to recall the success of the Multilateral Fund
established under the Montreal Protocol discussed above in subsection II.C of this
article. 130 Donors and the WTO can solve the lack of country-ownership problem
within the DDAGTF in one simple way - create a Executive Committee for the
DDAGTF modeled on that of the Multilateral Fund. Recall that all decisions as to
fund dispersals and project approvals under the Multilateral Fund were made by an
Executive Committee comprised equally of developed and developing nations. All
decision making occurs by consensus and a double-majority rule (two-thirds
overall, plus a majority of both developed and developing nations) was imposed on
any decisions taken by vote. This solution is both elegant and effective.

Towards a TransformativeAgenda for Africa's Development, 7 SAN DIEGO INT'L L. J. 5, 18-19 (2005)
(describing the external debt burdens of African countries as a "sword of Damocles").
129. "The Doha Development Agenda Global Trust Fund ("DDAGTF") was created following the
WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha, in November 2001, which launched a new round of
negotiations.'" World Trade Org., Denmark to Donate an Extra 600,000 Swiss Francs to WTO
TechnicalAssistance, Dec. 17, 2003, http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/pres03-e/pr369_e.htm,
130. See discussion supra Parts II.C.
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VI. CONCLUSION

Aid for trade has tremendous potential. It is an area that merits all the
attention it has recently receiving from the leadership of the WTO. Opportunities
abound in the shaping of aid for trade to benefit many constituencies, including the
WTO, developing nations, donors, and the aid and trade legal communities. The
international trading system has much to gain from the effective use of aid for
trade as a tool for fulfilling the promise of the Doha Development Agenda,
alleviating global poverty, and giving developing nations a well-deserved placed at
the table in the global trade regime. However, each group must also do its share in
making aid for trade a success. The roadmap provided in this article will hopefully
push all relevant players on the right path to making aid for trade a model a reality
and a success.

